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TIPPING THE PICKERING BALANCE:
A PROPOSAL FOR HEIGHTENED FIRST
AMENDMENT PROTECTION FOR THE
TEACHING AND SCHOLARSHIP OF
PUBLIC UNIVERSITY PROFESSORS
Joseph J. Martins*

For here we are not afraid to follow truth wherever it
may lead, nor to tolerate any error so long as reason is
left free to combat it.
—Thomas Jefferson
The world has revered teachers from time immemorial. Nations
still ponder the wisdom of Aristotle, Socrates, and Plato centuries after
their passing. We in America have dubbed educators the “priests of our
democracy.”1 But while there is little debate over the value of teachers
to our republic, there is much disagreement over how the Constitution
should protect their core academic speech. In the 2006 Garcetti v.
Ceballos2 decision, the Supreme Court implicitly questioned whether the
First Amendment provides any protection for the teaching and scholarship of professors at public universities. The Garcetti majority concluded that when public employees speak “pursuant to their official
duties,” such speech is not shielded by the Free Speech Clause.3 Rigidly
applying this test to public university faculty would eliminate the possibility of any constitutional shelter for instruction and research. Mindful
of this likelihood, the Court reserved for another day the specific application of its new test to public university faculty.
* Associate Professor of Law and Director of the Constitutional Litigation Clinic, Liberty University School of Law; B.A., University of Virginia; J.D., University of Tennessee
College of Law. The author wishes to thank the team that has supported this Article’s publication: E. Scott Copeland and Christopher Collins, for their outstanding research assistance; Liberty University School of Law, for giving me the opportunity to research and write on
fascinating areas of the law; my friend Travis C. Barham, for his keen insight and suggestions;
Professors Joel D. Hesch and Timothy M. Todd, for their invaluable suggestions; and the
editors and staff members of the Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy, for their tireless
work bringing this Article to the finish line. The author is forever grateful for the support and
encouragement provided by his family.
1 Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 196 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
2 547 U.S. 410 (2006).
3 Id. at 421.

649

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CJP\25-3\CJP303.txt

650

CORNELL JOURNAL

unknown

OF

LAW

AND

Seq: 2

PUBLIC POLICY

31-MAY-16

16:00

[Vol. 25:649

The Court’s reservation has sparked fierce scholarly debate over
the nature of constitutional protection for core academic speech. Many
scholars have contended that there is no such protection; others have
maintained that there is indeed constitutional shelter, but that it belongs
primarily to the university rather than the professor. Few have argued
for heightened protection for professors, and fewer still have provided an
adequate justification for such stricter scrutiny. This Article fills that
void by explaining how the policies underlying the public employee
speech doctrine warrant heightened First Amendment protection for
teaching and scholarship. This unique policy-based approach provides a
framework for courts to properly weigh professor speech claims—a
framework supported by the relevant academic freedom cases. This Article thus proposes that courts addressing speech retaliation claims involving teaching and scholarship should apply a modified public
employee speech test that presumptively weighs the balance of interests
in favor of the professors.
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INTRODUCTION
In March 2014, a federal jury in Wilmington, North Carolina, issued
an extraordinary verdict. The jury found that the University of North
Carolina at Wilmington (UNCW) violated the First Amendment rights of
Professor Mike Adams.4 Specifically, the jury found that Dr. Adams’s
speech as expressed in his scholarship and teaching was a “substantial or
motivating factor” in the University’s decision not to promote him to full
professor.5 Such speech retaliation verdicts are rare for academics, but
this favorable verdict was even more surprising because of an opinion
issued by the Supreme Court the year before Dr. Adams filed suit. In
2006, in Garcetti v. Ceballos,6 the Supreme Court held that the First
Amendment does not shield public employees from discipline when they
speak “pursuant to their official duties.”7 This new rule would seem to
erase the speech rights of public university professors such as Dr. Adams
who “necessarily speak and write ‘pursuant to . . . official duties.’”8 The
Garcetti Court acknowledged this possibility, but decided simply to reserve the matter for future adjudication.
But by failing to expressly exempt professors’ teaching and scholarship from its new “official duties” rule, the Court implicitly questioned
the availability of any First Amendment protection for such core academic speech. The Court’s injection of legal uncertainty over the rights
of public university faculty to teach and research has been the subject of
much scholarly debate.9 Some scholars have maintained that core academic speech is entitled to no protection under Garcetti,10 while others
4 Eugene Volokh, Conservative Professor-Blogger Wins Political Retaliation Case at
Trial, WASH. POST (May 19, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/
wp/2014/05/19/conservative-professor-blogger-wins-political-retaliation-case-at-trial/.
5 Verdict Form, Adams v. Trs. of Univ. of N.C.–Wilmington, 640 F.3d 550, No. 7:07CV-64-H (E.D.N.C. Mar. 20, 2014).
6 547 U.S. at 413.
7 Id. at 421.
8 Id. at 438 (Souter, J., dissenting).
9 See generally Kermit Roosevelt III, Not As Bad As You Think: Why Garcetti v. Ceballos Makes Sense, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 631 (2012) (arguing that Garcetti should be applied to
academic speech); Judith Areen, Government As Educator: A New Understanding of First
Amendment Protection of Academic Freedom and Governance, 97 GEO. L.J. 945, 988–89
(2009) (“Carving out an exception for faculty to the Garcetti official-duty test is one possible
response, but one that would be hard to defend.”); Bridget R. Nugent & Julee T. Flood, Rescuing Academic Freedom from Garcetti v. Ceballos: An Evaluation of Current Case Law and a
Proposal for the Protection of Core Academic, Administrative, and Advisory Speech, 40 J.C. &
U.L. 115 (2014) (arguing that courts should exempt core academic speech from Garcetti’s
“official duties” test); Robert J. Tepper & Craig G. White, Speak No Evil: Academic Freedom
and the Application of Garcetti v. Ceballos to Public University Faculty, 59 CATH. U. L. REV.
125 (2009) (arguing the same); Oren R. Griffin, Academic Freedom and Professorial Speech
in the Post-Garcetti World, 37 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1, 29 (2013) (arguing the same).
10 See Roosevelt III, supra note 9, at 658–59 (“On the whole, I think the best way to
conceive of scholarship from the First Amendment perspective is to think of it as akin to the

R

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CJP\25-3\CJP303.txt

652

CORNELL JOURNAL

unknown

OF

LAW

AND

Seq: 4

PUBLIC POLICY

31-MAY-16

16:00

[Vol. 25:649

have argued that such speech, while shielded, is entitled to only minimal
judicial scrutiny.11 Neither of these positions, however, adequately represents the security available for professors in their teaching and scholarship, for the core academic speech of professors is not merely protected
by the First Amendment—it is entitled to heightened protection.
Part I of this Article explores the development of the public employee speech doctrine and describes the balancing test used to evaluate
claims that the government has violated the First Amendment rights of
its employees. This Part also discusses how Garcetti’s “official duties”
rule potentially threatens to undermine the constitutional protection
available for public university faculty’s teaching and scholarship. Part II
explains how federal cases both before and after Garcetti recognize that
the First Amendment shields such core academic speech from official
reprisal by either the university or the state. Part III expands upon this
foundation and explains how the law and policy surrounding the public
employee speech doctrine warrants heightened First Amendment protection for professors when they teach and publish. According to this approach, which is novel among commentators but well-established in legal
policy, the public employee speech framework should be presumptively
balanced in favor of the public university professor. Part IV fully develops the modified public employee speech test that courts should apply to
professors’ speech retaliation claims. Under this framework, a public
university generally may not discipline professors for what they say in
their classrooms or their scholarship without a compelling or at least substantial justification. Finally, Part V examines and then rebuffs some
objections to this proposal for heightened judicial scrutiny.

fighting words in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul. It is generally unprotected, which is to say that
universities are free to assess its quality and reward or punish employees on that basis, consistent with their own tenure rules, but there are some criteria that cannot be used to evaluate it,
such as avowedly partisan or religious ones.”).
11 See Areen, supra note 9, at 995 (“Under the government-as-educator doctrine, if a
university shows that its disciplinary decision was supported by the faculty (or by an authorized committee of the faculty), a court should presume that the decision was made on academic grounds and defer to it. This presumption would not only be logical, it would have the
additional benefit of limiting judicial intrusion into the internal processes of most colleges and
universities. Judges are public officials, of course, so they should avoid infringing the academic freedom of academic institutions unless their intervention is necessary to protect the
academic freedom of faculty.”); Larry D. Spurgeon, The Endangered Citizen Servant: Garcetti
Versus the Public Interest and Academic Freedom, 39 J.C. & U.L. 405, 464 (2013) (“The
Court should answer the question posed by the [Garcetti] Caveat and exempt academic speech
from the public employee speech analysis. In its place, the Court should rely upon its existing
policy of deference to both the institution and the community of scholars.”).
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I. THE GARCETTI PROBLEM
A. The Public Employee Speech Doctrine
Throughout much of the twentieth century, the First Amendment12
protection afforded to public employees was quite simple to quantify because it was virtually nonexistent. While the government could not directly infringe upon constitutional rights, it could do so indirectly by
conditioning receipt of its benefits—such as funding, licenses, or public
employment—on the qualification or outright surrender of constitutional
freedoms.13 This doctrine gradually yielded over time as the Supreme
Court recognized that citizens do not shed all their rights when they work
for the government.14 In 1963, the Court confidently declared that it was
well-established that the state could not condition public employment on
a basis that infringed upon the employee’s First Amendment rights: “It is
too late in the day to doubt that the liberties of religion and expression
may be infringed by the denial of or placing of conditions upon a benefit
or privilege.”15 Yet the precise scope of this protection would require
further development, particularly in the public employment context.
The Supreme Court began to define the modern contours of protection for public employee speech in Pickering v. Board of Education of
Township High School District 205.16 In that case, high school teacher
12 U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a
redress of grievances.”).
13 See Joseph J. Martins, First Amendment Enclave: Is the Public University Curriculum
Immune from the Sweep of the Compelled Speech Doctrine?, 50 TULSA L. REV. 157, 171–80
(2014) (discussing the right-privilege doctrine); see also Adler v. Bd. of Educ., 342 U.S. 485,
492 (1952) (“It is clear that [persons employed or seeking employment in the public schools]
have the right under our law to assemble, speak, think and believe as they will. It is equally
clear that they have no right to work for the State in the school system on their own terms.
They may work for the school system upon the reasonable terms laid down by the proper
authorities of New York. If they do not choose to work on such terms, they are at liberty to
retain their beliefs and associations and go elsewhere. Has the State thus deprived them of any
right to free speech or assembly? We think not.”); McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 29
N.E. 517, 517 (Mass. 1892) (holding that the city did not violate the First Amendment when it
fired a police officer for engaging in political activities because the officer did not have a right
to public employment).
14 See Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972) (“[T]his Court has made clear that
even though a person has no ‘right’ to a valuable governmental benefit and even though the
government may deny him the benefit for any number of reasons, there are some reasons upon
which the government may not rely. It may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that
infringes his constitutionally protected interests—especially, his interest in freedom of speech.
For if the government could deny a benefit to a person because of his constitutionally protected speech or associations, his exercise of those freedoms would in effect be penalized and
inhibited. This would allow the government to ‘produce a result which [it] could not command directly.’ Such interference with constitutional rights is impermissible.”).
15 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963).
16 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
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Marvin Pickering was fired for sending a letter to a local newspaper that
criticized the school’s mismanagement of public monies.17 Pickering
sued, alleging that his firing violated the First Amendment, but the Illinois courts found no constitutional objection to his termination.18 The
Supreme Court disagreed. The Court affirmed that teachers and other
public employees do not relinquish their First Amendment rights to comment as citizens on matters of public interest.19 Such opinions are, in
fact, “vital to informed decision-making by the electorate.”20 However,
the Court also maintained that the state has unique interests as an employer in regulating the speech of its employees.21 Accordingly, federal
courts must arrive at a “balance between the interests of the teacher, as a
citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of
the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees.”22 The Court concluded that
this balance favored Pickering because he spoke on a legitimate matter of
public concern and because his comments neither impeded the performance of his classroom duties nor interfered with the general operation of
the schools.23
The Court added additional context to this analysis in Givhan v.
Western Line Consolidated School District.24 Bessie Givhan was fired
from her job as a junior high English teacher after she told her principal
that she believed the school district’s employment policies discriminated
against racial minorities.25 The district court ruled in her favor, but the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, holding
that her expression was not protected by the First Amendment because
she shared her opinions privately with the principal.26 The Supreme
Court rejected this view and held instead that a public employee does not
lose the freedom of speech when he chooses to “communicate privately
with his employer.”27 In essence, the Court ruled that the liberty of
speech does not depend on the public employee’s immediate audience.
The Court next refined the employee speech doctrine in Connick v.
Myers.28 In Connick, assistant district attorney Sheila Myers brought a
First Amendment action against her employer after she was fired for cir17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

Id. at 564.
Id. at 565.
Id. at 571–73.
Id. at 572.
Id. at 568.
Id.
Id. at 572–73.
439 U.S. 410 (1979).
Id. at 411–13.
Id. at 413.
Id. at 415.
461 U.S. 138 (1983).
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culating a questionnaire regarding office morale.29 The lower federal
courts ruled in Myers’s favor, but the Supreme Court reversed, holding
that her discharge was not subject to judicial review because her questionnaire could not fairly be characterized “as constituting speech on a
matter of public concern.”30 The Court examined the “content, form, and
context”31 of Myers’s statements and concluded that her speech was
largely unrelated “to any matter of political, social, or other concern to
the community . . . .”32 Consequently, unlike Pickering and Givhan, Myers spoke as an employee on matters of personal interest33:
[W]hen a public employee speaks not as a citizen upon
matters of public concern, but instead as an employee
upon matters only of personal interest, absent the most
unusual circumstances, a federal court is not the appropriate forum in which to review the wisdom of a personnel decision taken by a public agency allegedly in
reaction to the employee’s behavior.34
Therefore, the Court rejected Myers’s First Amendment claim in light of
its opinion that her speech was a simple employee grievance.35
Pickering and its progeny thus identified two principal inquiries to
use in determining whether a public employee’s speech is protected by
the First Amendment. The first is whether the employee spoke as a “citizen on a matter of public concern.”36 A negative answer to this threshold
question ends the analysis, while a positive one opens the possibility of
First Amendment protection.37 The second inquiry asks whether the employee’s interest in the speech and the public’s interest in receiving it
outweigh the government’s interest in providing public services efficiently.38 The Pickering test thus balances the competing interests of a
public employee and the government when an employee speaks on issues
29

Id. at 141.
Id. at 142, 146. The Court determined that one of the questions in Myers’s survey did
touch on a matter of public concern. However, the Court ultimately concluded that this question threatened the close working relationships necessary for efficient functioning of the District Attorney’s office. Because the employer’s interests thus outweighed Myers’s interest in
her speech, her termination did not violate the First Amendment. Id. at 149–54.
31 Id. at 147–48.
32 Id. at 146.
33 Id. at 147.
34 Id.
35 Id. at 154.
36 Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 418 (2006).
37 Id.
38 Id. at 417 (quoting Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968)); Ridpath v.
Bd. of Governors, 447 F.3d 292, 317 (4th Cir. 2006).
30
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of public concern.39 This two-pronged analysis has remained the standard test for public employee speech claims for decades.
B. Garcetti v. Ceballos
In 2006, the Supreme Court added a significant threshold layer to
the Pickering analysis by determining that a public employee is not insulated from retaliation by an employer when the employee speaks “pursuant to [his] professional duties.”40 In Garcetti, Richard Ceballos, a
deputy district attorney, composed a memo discussing the inaccuracies of
an affidavit used to obtain a search warrant.41 Ceballos also testified in a
hearing for the defense after his office initiated a prosecution.42 Subsequently, Ceballos was reassigned, transferred, and ultimately denied a
promotion.43 Ceballos sued his employer, alleging that the employer violated his First Amendment rights by retaliating against him in response
to his memo.44
The Court held that Ceballos was not entitled to protection from
employer discipline because Ceballos was not speaking as a citizen, but
pursuant to his duties as a deputy district attorney.45 “[W]hen public
employees make statements pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the
Constitution does not insulate their communications from employer discipline.”46 This principle, the Court explained, simply recognizes “the
exercise of employer control over what the employer itself has commissioned or created.”47
The Court, however, issued this “official duties” rule with an important reservation, in response to Justice Souter’s dissent. Justice Souter
feared that the Court’s new rule would “imperil First Amendment protection of academic freedom in public colleges and universities, whose
teachers necessarily speak and write ‘pursuant to . . . official duties.’”48
Justice Souter pointed out that the Court has “long recognized that, given
the important purpose of public education and the expansive freedoms of
speech and thought associated with the university environment, universities occupy a special niche in our constitutional tradition.”49 The major39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49

Adams v. Trs. of Univ. of N.C.–Wilmington, 640 F.3d 550, 560 (4th Cir. 2011).
Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 426.
Id. at 413–14.
Id. at 414–15.
Id. at 415.
Id.
Id. at 421.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 422.
Id. at 438 (Souter, J., dissenting).
Id. (Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 329 (2003)).
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ity responded to these concerns by reserving the question of whether the
“official duties” threshold would apply in the public university setting:
There is some argument that expression related to academic scholarship or classroom instruction implicates
additional constitutional interests that are not fully accounted for by this Court’s customary employee-speech
jurisprudence. We need not, and for that reason do not,
decide whether the analysis we conduct today would apply in the same manner to a case involving speech related to scholarship or teaching.50
Consequently, the question as to whether the Garcetti doctrine applies to
the scholarship and teaching of public university professors was left unanswered by the Court.
II. PUBLIC UNIVERSITY PROFESSORS’ TEACHING AND SCHOLARSHIP IS
PROTECTED BY THE FIRST AMENDMENT
By failing to expressly exempt speech related to teaching and scholarship from its “official duties” rule, the Garcetti Court left a cloud of
uncertainty over the constitutional protection available for such core academic speech. Some might argue that this vagueness merely reflects the
historical elusiveness of the Supreme Court’s academic freedom jurisprudence.51 Indeed, the Court’s opinions in this area have led numerous
scholars to debate whether a separate right to academic freedom inures to
the university,52 to the professor,53 or to both,54 or indeed whether such a
50

Id. at 425.
Hillis v. Stephen F. Austin State Univ., 665 F.2d 547, 552–53 (5th Cir. 1982) (“While
academic freedom is well recognized . . . its perimeters are ill-defined and the case law defining it is inconsistent.”).
52 J. Peter Byrne, Academic Freedom: A “Special Concern of the First Amendment,” 99
YALE L.J. 251, 311 (1989) (“In the last decade, the Supreme Court’s decisions concerning
academic freedom have protected principally and expressly a First Amendment right of the
university itself—understood in its corporate capacity—largely to be free from government
interference in the performance of core educational functions.”).
53 David M. Rabban, Functional Analysis of “Individual” and “Institutional” Academic
Freedom Under the First Amendment, 53 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 227, 230 (1990) (“Some
commentators have maintained that the courts, especially the Supreme Court, seem to be defining constitutional academic freedom exclusively in institutional terms. Indeed, a major recent analysis comments approvingly on this perceived development. I disagree. Courts may
have been presented with more institutional claims than individual claims of academic freedom, but they have also recognized that the [F]irst [A]mendment protects individual academic
freedom.”).
54 Spurgeon, supra note 11, at 432 (“Scholars have long debated whether the Court has
recognized a distinct constitutional right of academic freedom for the individual, for the institution, or both.”).
51

R
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right exists at all.55 However, resorting to an independent theory of academic freedom is not necessary to address the question left unanswered
by the Garcetti Court.56 Relevant federal precedent—both before and
after Garcetti—reveals a consistent and resounding theme: The Free
Speech Clause provides a shield for the academic scholarship and classroom teaching of public university faculty. Accordingly, professors can
speak as citizens on matters of public concern, even when teaching and
writing pursuant to their official duties.
A. Supreme Court Precedent
Keyishian v. Board of Regents of the University of the State of New
York57 affirms that professors have First Amendment rights in expression
related to their classroom instruction and academic scholarship.58 In
Keyishian, professors at a state university challenged a state statute and
its related university regulations that “prevent[ed] the appointment or retention of ‘subversive’ persons in state employment.”59 Essentially,
these regulations disqualified from employment any person who advocated or published material that advocated “the overthrow of government
by . . . any unlawful means.”60 The University ensured compliance by
requiring an “annual review of every teacher to determine whether any
utterance or act of his, inside the classroom or out, came within the sanc55 Roosevelt III, supra note 9, at 658 (“The ideal of independent and untrammeled scholarship is generally described as academic freedom. This sort of individual academic freedom
has never been clearly recognized as a First Amendment right.”); Spurgeon, supra note 11, at
432 (“The public policy for academic freedom as special concern of the First Amendment is
strong and clear. The nature of the constitutional right, if any, is not.”); Rabban, supra note
53, at 244 (“But as the Supreme Court has recognized, it is the free speech clause, not the
special [F]irst [A]mendment right of academic freedom, that provides the constitutional basis
for this protection.”).
56 See DEREK BOK, HIGHER EDUCATION IN AMERICA 359 (2015) (“Today, professors are
protected in their teaching and writing both by the doctrine of academic freedom and by the
First Amendment of the Constitution.”).
57 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
58 Id. at 603. Ten years prior, in Sweezy v. New Hampshire, the Supreme Court laid the
groundwork for the Keyishian decision by recognizing that professors retain constitutional
liberties in the area of academic freedom. 354 U.S. 235, 266 (1957). Sweezy was investigated
by the New Hampshire attorney general for possible “subversive activities” after he delivered
a guest lecture at the University of New Hampshire. Id. at 237–45. Sweezy was ultimately
convicted of contempt for refusing to answer questions about his lecture and he appealed. Id.
at 245. The Supreme Court overturned the conviction, but the Justices could not agree on a
constitutional basis for the decision. Id. at 255. Chief Justice Warren’s plurality opinion held
that the State’s use of the contempt power violated due process. Id. at 254–55. Justice Frankfurter concurred, but he appeared to rest his opinion on the Free Speech Clause. Id. at 260–64.
Both opinions extolled the virtues of academic freedom and acknowledged that the State had
invaded Sweezy’s constitutionally protected “right to lecture.” Id. at 249–50, 260–61.
59 Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 591–92.
60 Id. at 593.
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tions of the laws.”61 The Court struck down the regulatory scheme, finding it to be unconstitutionally vague and overbroad:62
We emphasize once again that ‘[p]recision of regulation
must be the touchstone in an area so closely touching our
most precious freedoms,’ ‘[f]or standards of permissible
statutory vagueness are strict in the area of free expression. Because First Amendment freedoms need breathing space to survive, government may regulate in the
area only with narrow specificity.’ New York’s complicated and intricate scheme plainly violates that
standard.63
The Court went on to explain that the regulatory scheme failed constitutional scrutiny precisely because of its suffocating effect upon teaching
and scholarship.64
For example, one regulation prevented retention of anyone who
“‘advocates, advises or teaches the doctrine’ of forceful overthrow of
government.”65 According to the Court, this language was so vague that
it could be applied improperly to a teacher who simply “advis[es] . . . the
existence of the doctrine” or who “informs his class about the precepts of
Marxism or the Declaration of Independence . . . .”66 Thus, the Court
voided this regulation specifically to avoid the inevitable “chilling effect
upon the exercise of vital First Amendment rights” in the classroom.67
Similarly, the Court invalidated a companion provision that also
blocked retention of anyone who distributes “written material ‘containing
or advocating, advising or teaching the doctrine’ of forceful overthrow
[of government] . . . .”68 The Court asked whether the prohibition
banned publications containing the “histories of the evolution of Marxist
doctrine or tracing the background of the French, American, or Russian
revolutions?”69 The Court answered its own rhetorical question by concluding that the regulation reached beyond these topics to even forbid the
“mere expression of belief.”70 The regulation thus violated the First
61

Id. at 601–02.
Id. at 604. Although the Court does not specifically use the term “overbroad,” its
reference to “sweeping and improper application” speaks in terms of overbreadth. See id. at
599. Indeed, the Court has confirmed that Keyishian involved facial overbreadth in subsequent cases. See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 564 n.1 (1968); Broadrick v.
Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612 (1973).
63 Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 603–04 (citations omitted).
64 Id.
65 Id. at 599 (quoting N.Y. CIV. SERV. LAW § 105(1)(a)).
66 Id. at 600.
67 Id. at 604.
68 Id. at 600 (quoting N.Y. CIV. SERV. LAW § 105(1)(b)).
69 Id. at 600–01.
70 Id. at 601.
62
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Amendment by creating an “atmosphere of suspicion and distrust” in
which “scholarship cannot flourish.”71
Keyishian teaches several important lessons relevant to the question
reserved in Garcetti. First and foremost, professors can find refuge in
the First Amendment when they teach and publish. Additionally, professors can assert this liberty interest directly against the state and the university itself, as the professors in Keyishian did.72 Finally, public
university faculty do not forfeit this freedom simply because they teach
and publish “pursuant to their official duties”73 as evidenced by the
Court’s censure of the University’s use of the “annual review of every
teacher” to enforce its regulations.74 Given these clear answers, the
Garcetti Court should have expressly exempted core academic speech
from its “official duties” rule to affirm that the First Amendment safeguards such speech.
B. Pre-Garcetti Precedent in the Federal Courts of Appeals
Following the Keyishian Court’s lead, the federal courts of appeals
have also confirmed that professors’ academic speech is entitled to free
speech protection. For example, in Dube v. State University of New
York,75 Assistant Professor Ernest Dube claimed the University retaliated
against him “based on [his] discussion of controversial topics in his
classroom . . . .”76 In Professor Dube’s “Race and Politics” course, he
presented Zionism, Nazism, and apartheid as examples of racism.77 After receiving several complaints, the University cancelled the course, denied Dube’s subsequent application for promotion and tenure, and
terminated his appointment.78 In court, school officials moved for qualified immunity on summary judgment, but the Second Circuit, relying on
both Keyishian and Pickering, firmly rejected this defense:
71

Id. at 603 (quoting Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957)).
See id. at 589 (stating that the primary defendant in Keyishian was the Board of Regents of the University of the State of New York); see also Matthew W. Finken, On “Institutional” Academic Freedom, 61 TEX. L. REV. 817, 842 (1983) (confirming that the regulations
in Keyishian “worked a direct invasion only of the political freedom of the individual faculty
members”). This point cannot be overemphasized, as many scholars have overlooked the fact
that the university regents, through their own regulations, implemented the state laws against
the professors. See, e.g., Rabban, supra note 53, at 289 (“The Supreme Court has yet to
address the merits of an individual claim by a faculty member against peers, the administration, or the trustees.”).
73 Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006).
74 Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 601–02.
75 900 F.2d 587 (2d Cir. 1990).
76 Id. at 588–89 (alteration in original).
77 Id. at 589.
78 Id. at 591–92.
72
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[F]or decades it has been clearly established that the
First Amendment tolerates neither laws nor other means
of coercion, persuasion or intimidation “that cast a pall
of orthodoxy” over the free exchange of ideas in the
classroom. We therefore conclude that, assuming the defendants retaliated against Dube based on the content of
his classroom discourse, such conduct was, as a matter
of law, objectively un reasonable.79
In other words, punishing a professor based on his or her classroom
teaching is not even arguably constitutional. The Second Circuit thus
powerfully confirmed that the First Amendment severely limits the
power of public university employers to discipline professors for their inclass speech.
Likewise, the Sixth Circuit denied qualified immunity to college officials when they retaliated against communications instructor Kenneth
Hardy for using offensive language in his classroom.80 In the course,
entitled “Introduction to Interpersonal Communication,” Hardy used the
words “nigger” and “bitch,” as well as other loaded terms, as part of a
classroom discussion to examine the impact of disparaging words upon
oppressed groups in society.81 After an African-American student complained about the class, the College decided not to renew Hardy’s teaching contract.82 College officials argued that they surely possessed the
authority to discipline Hardy for using “sexist and racially derogatory”
language in class.83 But the Sixth Circuit disagreed:
[T]he argument that teachers have no First Amendment
rights when teaching, or that the government can censor
teacher speech without restriction, is totally unpersuasive. . . . There is no doubt that the right allegedly violated in this case, based on the freedom of speech
protected by the First Amendment, is one of our most
fundamental and established constitutional rights.84
Again, the court relied directly on Keyishian to reach its conclusion. And
again, the court’s holding left no doubt about the First Amendment’s
reach into the college classroom.
Dube and Hardy present powerful reminders of the constitutional
haven available for speech related to teaching. Indeed, the speech at issue in both cases touched upon highly sensitive and potentially inflam79
80
81
82
83
84

Id. at 598 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
Hardy v. Jefferson Cmty. Coll., 260 F.3d 671 (6th Cir. 2001).
Id. at 674–75.
Id. at 675.
Id. at 680.
Id. at 680–82.
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matory matters, yet both courts condemned the schools’ actions as being
clearly impermissible. While these cases represent perhaps the strongest
of such statements in the circuits prior to Garcetti, virtually every other
federal court of appeals has regarded a professor’s classroom speech as
constitutionally protected to some degree.85
While far fewer circuit courts have directly addressed the protection
available for academic scholarship, the aforementioned body of cases
likewise lends support to the position that public university faculty have
speech rights in their scholarly writing. As a matter of constitutional
policy, a public university’s interest in restricting speech—if any—must
be greater in a classroom setting with a captive audience of students than
in an external audience of scholars.86 Accordingly, scholarship should
receive at least as much protection as teaching.

85 See Vanderhurst v. Colo. Mountain Coll. Dist., 208 F.3d 908, 913 (10th Cir. 2000)
(recognizing that “teachers’ classroom speech is entitled to some First Amendment protection”); Berg v. Bruce, 112 F.3d 322, 329 (8th Cir. 1997) (“Academic freedom is designed to
‘protect the individual professor’s classroom method from the arbitrary interference of university officials.’”); Cohen v. San Bernardino Valley Coll., 92 F.3d 968, 971–72 (9th Cir. 1996)
(holding that imposition of discipline upon a professor for his sexually oriented classroom
teaching violated the First Amendment because the college’s sexual harassment policy was
unconstitutionally vague); Ward v. Hickey, 996 F.2d 448, 452 (1st Cir. 1993) (holding that
public schools may limit a teacher’s classroom speech only if “the regulation is reasonably
related to a legitimate pedagogical concern” and “the school provided the teacher with notice
of what conduct was prohibited”); Bishop v. Aronov, 926 F.2d 1066, 1075–76 (11th Cir. 1991)
(construing university’s restrictions on a professor’s classroom speech “narrowly because they
implicate First Amendment freedoms”); Hillis v. Stephen F. Austin State Univ., 665 F.2d 547,
552–53 (5th Cir. 1982) (noting that the roots of academic freedom “have been found in the
[F]irst [A]mendment insofar as it protects against infringements on a teacher’s freedom concerning classroom content and method”); Clark v. Holmes, 474 F.2d 928, 931 (7th Cir. 1972)
(officially recognizing that “although academic freedom is not one of the enumerated rights of
the First Amendment, it is now clear that academic freedom, the preservation of the classroom
as a ‘market place of ideas,’ is one of the safeguarded rights”). But see Boring v. Buncombe
Cty. Bd. of Educ., 136 F.3d 364 (4th Cir. 1998) (holding that a public school drama teacher
had no First Amendment rights in her selection of plays because drama was part of the school
curriculum); Edwards v. Cal. Univ. of Pa., 156 F.3d 488, 491 (3d Cir. 1998) (concluding that
“a public university professor does not have a First Amendment right to decide what will be
taught in the classroom”); Scallet v. Rosenblum, 106 F.3d 391 (4th Cir. 1997) (granting qualified immunity to university officials because “the parameters of the protection afforded to a
university professor’s academic speech were not clearly defined in May 1992 and are not
clearly defined today”).
86 See Martin v. Parrish, 805 F.2d 583, 586 (5th Cir. 1983) (holding that professor’s use
of profanity in the classroom was not protected because the language “constituted a deliberate,
superfluous attack on a ‘captive audience’ with no academic purpose or justification”); Clark,
474 F.2d at 931 (holding that professor’s use of class time to criticize the university’s administration and faculty was not protected because the criticisms were made “to a captive audience . . . that was composed of students who were dependent on him for grades and
recommendations”). Furthermore, the Supreme Court’s Givhan decision seems to limit the
relevance of the public employee’s audience for purposes of the Pickering analysis. See supra
Part I.A (discussing Givhan).
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The Second Circuit addressed the matter directly and expressly affirmed the speech protections available to a professor’s publications. In
Levin v. Harleston,87 college administrators formally investigated Professor Michael Levin and encouraged students to transfer to an alternative
class section after he authored three publications88 that denigrated the
“intelligence and social characteristics of blacks.”89 Fearing termination,
Professor Levin turned down multiple offers to speak and write about his
racial theories.90 The College defended its actions on the grounds that it
did not actually impose discipline or prevent him from teaching and publishing.91 The Second Circuit was not convinced. It held that the College’s reprisals created a “judicially cognizable chilling effect on
Professor Levin’s First Amendment rights”92 which represented the “antithesis of freedom of expression.”93 The Second Circuit, thus, affirmed
that the First Amendment limits the power of public universities to discipline professors for their scholarly speech. The pre-Garcetti legal landscape, therefore, left little room for the argument that public university
professors forfeit their free speech rights when they enter the classroom
or pick up a pen.
C. Post-Garcetti Precedent in the Federal Courts of Appeals
Perhaps recognizing this weight of authority, the two federal circuit
courts that directly addressed the matter after Garcetti continued to
shield professors’ core academic speech from official reprisal, even when
professors were speaking pursuant to professional duties.94 Both the
87

966 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1992).
Id. at 87. The publications consisted of a letter to the New York Times, a book review
published in an Australian psychology journal, and a letter published in the American Philosophical Association Proceedings.
89 Id.
90 Id. at 89.
91 Id. at 88–89.
92 Id. at 89.
93 Id. at 88.
94 Two other federal courts of appeal have addressed professor speech after Garcetti, but
the speech at issue was not related to teaching or scholarship. In Renken v. Gregory, 541 F.3d
769 (7th Cir. 2008), the Seventh Circuit reviewed a professor’s claim that he faced official
reprisal for criticizing the university’s use of proposed grant funds. Professor Kevin Renken
secured a grant from the National Science Foundation that required matching funds from the
school. Id. at 770–71. During the administration of the grant, Renken and the school’s dean
disagreed on the allocation of the funds. Id. at 771–72. Renken filed an internal complaint
against the dean and sent emails that criticized the university’s proposed use of the grant
monies. Id. at 772. Consequently, the university decided to return the funds to the National
Science Foundation. Id. at 773. Renken filed suit, alleging that the university retaliated
against him by reducing his pay and returning the grant funds in violation of his free-speech
rights. Id. The district court awarded summary judgment to the university and the Seventh
Circuit affirmed, expressly relying on Garcetti. Id. at 774. In its analysis, the court of appeals
did not even consider Garcetti’s reservation. This position was justified because Renken’s
88
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Fourth Circuit and the Ninth Circuit effectively exempted teaching and
scholarship from Garcetti’s “official duties” threshold.
In Adams v. Trustees of University of North Carolina–Wilmington,
the Fourth Circuit became the first court of appeals to directly address
how Garcetti would affect state university professors disciplined for
speech related to their teaching and scholarship.95 In 1993, Dr. Michael
S. Adams was hired as an assistant professor of criminology in the Sociology and Criminal Justice Department at UNCW.96 After being promoted to associate professor with tenure, Dr. Adams became a Christian,
a change that transformed his religious and political beliefs.97 Following
his conversion, Dr. Adams wrote numerous website columns, delivered
speeches, and published two books, all of which addressed a variety of
social and political topics from a distinctly conservative perspective.98
Dr. Adams relied on these activities, as well as his eleven peer-reviewed
journal publications, numerous teaching awards, and a school-wide service award, when he applied for promotion to full professor in 2004.99
The department chair denied his application.100 Dr. Adams filed a
speech retaliation claim in federal court, but the district court entered
summary judgment for UNCW, holding that Adams was acting pursuant
to his duties as a professor when he listed his “columns, publications and
public appearances” in his application for promotion.101
Adams appealed and the Fourth Circuit reversed, concluding that
the district court erred as a matter of law when it applied the “official
duties” rule to Dr. Adams’s teaching and scholarship102:
speech was tied directly to a specific administrative job he was paid to do rather than teaching
and scholarship.
In Gorum v. Sessoms, 561 F.3d 179 (3d Cir. 2009), Professor Wendell Gorum faced
discipline for altering student grades in violation of university policy. Id. at 182. A university
board recommended suspension but the president of the university recommended and procured
Gorum’s termination. Id. at 183. In response, Gorum sued, alleging that his termination was
actually done in retaliation for his protected speech and association. Id. at 183. Specifically,
Gorum alleged that he was terminated because he represented a student-athlete during a school
disciplinary proceeding and because he had revoked the school president’s invitation to speak
at a fraternity prayer breakfast. Id. at 183–84. The court of appeals applied Garcetti and ruled
that these activities were not entitled to constitutional protection because they were done pursuant to Gorum’s official duties. Id. at 186. The Third Circuit, unlike the Seventh Circuit,
expressly noted that Gorum’s speech was “not speech related to scholarship or teaching.” Id.
95 640 F.3d 550 (4th Cir. 2011). The author represented Dr. Adams through his appeal
to the Fourth Circuit.
96 Id. at 553.
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 Id. at 554.
100 Id. at 555.
101 Id. at 561.
102 Id. at 562.

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CJP\25-3\CJP303.txt

2016]

TIPPING

unknown

THE

Seq: 17

31-MAY-16

PICKERING BALANCE

16:00

665

Applying Garcetti to the academic work of a public university faculty member under the facts of this case could
place beyond the reach of First Amendment protection
many forms of public speech or service a professor engaged in during his employment. That would not appear
to be what Garcetti intended, nor is it consistent with our
long-standing recognition that no individual loses his
ability to speak as a private citizen by virtue of public
employment.103
UNCW argued that Adams’s speech was made pursuant to his official
duties because he was employed as a professor “to engage in scholarship,
research and service to the community.”104 But this reading of Garcetti
was too abstract for the Fourth Circuit. In its view, the “official duties”
analysis requires a closer nexus between the speech and the alleged job
duty, especially in the academic context:
Put simply, Adams’ speech was not tied to any more
specific or direct employee duty than the general concept
that professors will engage in writing, public appearances, and service within their respective fields. . . .
[T]hat thin thread is insufficient to render Adams’
speech “pursuant to [his] official duties” as intended by
Garcetti.105
To further emphasize its point, the Fourth Circuit denied the defendants’
qualified immunity defense, ruling instead that Adams’s right to speak as
a private citizen on matters of public concern was clearly established.106
After Adams, it is evident that public university faculty members’ scholarship and teaching shall not be considered part of their job duties simply
because they hold the title of “professor.”
The Ninth Circuit followed the Fourth Circuit’s lead and upheld the
protection of core academic speech in the public university context.107
In Demers v. Austin, David Demers alleged that Washington State University (WSU) officials retaliated against him for distributing a pamphlet
calling for the restructuring of his department.108 The district court
granted summary judgment to the defendants, reasoning that Demers’s
pamphlet was made “in the performance of Demers’s official duties as a
103
104
105
106
107
108

Id. at 564.
Id.
Id. (second alteration in original).
Id. at 565–66.
Demers v. Austin, 746 F.3d 402, 418 (9th Cir. 2014).
Id. at 406–07.
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faculty member of WSU and [was] therefore not protected under the
First Amendment.”109
The Ninth Circuit agreed that Demers wrote and distributed the
pamphlet as part of his official duties within the meaning of Garcetti,110
but did not concur as to the legal consequences of that conclusion. Citing to Adams for support, the appellate court reversed, holding “that
Garcetti does not—indeed, consistent with the First Amendment, cannot—apply to teaching and academic writing that are performed ‘pursuant to the official duties’ of a teacher or professor.”111 The Ninth Circuit
thereby carved an explicit exception into Garcetti for academic scholarship and classroom instruction. Demers thus followed Adams’s rationale
regarding the provision of clear protection for academic freedom. Both
decisions cautioned that Garcetti should not be applied to teaching and
scholarship. Consequently, both decisions soundly affirmed what federal
courts had been saying for decades prior to Garcetti: Public university
faculty can still speak as citizens on matters of public concern when they
teach and publish.112
III.

CORE ACADEMIC SPEECH IS ENTITLED TO HEIGHTENED FIRST
AMENDMENT PROTECTION

Establishing that core academic speech implicates the First Amendment does not, however, address the extent to which such speech is constitutionally insulated. Of course, under the public employee speech
doctrine, a professor must speak on a matter of public concern to make
any claim upon the Free Speech Clause.113 Assuming a professor’s
109 Id. at 409. The court “put to one side” Demers’s draft chapters because the chapters
were not included in the record. Id. at 413–14. Hence, the court only considered the pamphlet
outlining Demers’s restructuring plan. Id.
110 Id. at 410.
111 Id. at 412 (emphasis added).
112 Two federal district courts have similarly refused to apply Garcetti to the classroom
instruction of public university professors. See Kerr v. Hurd, 694 F. Supp. 2d 817, 844 (S.D.
Ohio 2010) (“At least where, as here, the expressed views are well within the range of accepted medical opinion, they should certainly receive First Amendment protection, particularly
at the university level.”); Sheldon v. Dhillon, No. C-08-03438 RMW, 2009 WL 4282086, at *4
(N.D. Cal. Nov. 25, 2009) (“To the extent that the defendants took action against plaintiff
because of her instructional speech to her class, and assuming without deciding at this stage of
the proceedings that the instructional speech was within the parameters of the approved curriculum and within academic norms—i.e., that the defendants’ actions were not reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns—then the complaint has stated a claim for relief
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”). But see Nichols v. Univ. of S. Miss., 669 F. Supp. 2d 684, 698
(S.D. Miss. 2009) (holding that a professor’s comments made to a student in class about homosexuality were made pursuant to the professor’s official duties).
113 This Article addresses the level of judicial scrutiny appropriate for teaching and scholarship that touches upon matters of public concern. While a professor claiming retaliation
must establish that his speech touches upon such matters, this should not be a high hurdle. See
Hardy v. Jefferson Cmty. Coll., 260 F.3d 671, 679 (6th Cir. 2001) (“Because the essence of a
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speech meets this threshold, how should courts “balance between the interests of the teacher, as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public
concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the
efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees[?]”114
This Article now turns to that question.
Many scholars have argued that the constitutional balance should be
weighted in favor of the school to reflect either the university’s “academic freedom”115 or the perceived inability of judges to make purely
academic decisions.116 While there is some precedent for this position,117 this section argues that the Pickering balance should be tipped in
favor of the professor when the speech at issue is related to teaching and
scholarship. As will be discussed below, this conclusion is buttressed by
the very policy concerns used to justify the employee speech doctrine
and the federal precedent in the academic setting.
A. Policy Underlying Pickering
To determine if a public employee’s speech on a matter of public
concern is ultimately protected, Pickering requires the court to balance
both the employee’s interest and society’s interest in the speech against
the needs of the government to perform its public functions.118 The unteacher’s role is to prepare students for their place in society as responsible citizens, classroom
instruction will often fall within the Supreme Court’s broad conception of ‘public concern.’”);
Scallet v. Rosenblum, 911 F. Supp. 999, 1013 (W.D. Va. 1996), aff’d, 106 F.3d 391 (4th Cir.
1997) (“[Plaintiff-Instructor] as an educator, routinely and necessarily discusses issues of public concern when speaking as an employee. Indeed, it is part of his educational mandate.”).
114 See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).
115 Byrne, supra note 52, at 311 (“The Court has come to limit the judiciary’s role to
excluding non-academics from imposing ideological criteria on academic decision-making,
while refusing to impose substantive limits on academic administrators who in good faith
penalize faculty for academic speech. Even though the Court’s approach appears anomalous
given that the main thrust of the non-legal tradition of academic freedom has been to secure
the autonomy of the individual teacher against improper interference by administrators, I have
argued that the Court has struck the appropriate balance between its desire to protect free
scholarship and its concern about involving itself in academic disputes.”).
116 Id. at 286 (“It is incoherent to suggest that academic freedom could be furthered by
reducing peer review and substituting the enforcement of rules by lay persons such as
judges.”).
117 Regents of Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 225 (1985) (“When judges are
asked to review the substance of a genuinely academic decision, such as this one, they should
show great respect for the faculty’s professional judgment. Plainly, they may not override it
unless it is such a substantial departure from accepted academic norms as to demonstrate that
the person or committee responsible did not actually exercise professional judgment.”).
118 Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 420 (2006). Certainly, the interests of the employee and the public will vary depending upon the nature of actual statements made. Indeed,
the federal courts have consistently held that “[t]he government employer must make a
stronger showing of the potential for inefficiency or disruption when the employee’s speech
involves a ‘more substantial[ ]’ matter of public concern.” Love-Lane v. Martin, 355 F.3d
766, 778 (4th Cir. 2004) (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 152 (1983)). Notwithstanding, Pickering and its progeny have provided general guidelines for balancing the em-
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derlying policy goal behind this balance is thus the maximization of employee expression on matters of public concern consistent with the
mission of the particular governmental entity. In the academic context,
because the First Amendment value of core academic speech to the professor and society is so high, and the university’s corresponding interest
in restraining such speech is so minimal, the Pickering balance should
weigh decidedly in the professor’s favor.
1. The Professor’s Interest in Core Academic Speech
The Pickering Court tied the importance of the public employee’s
interest in his speech directly to its contribution to the “free and open
debate” necessary to inform the electorate on matters of public interest.119 The Court further explained that when teachers have more “informed and definite opinions” on certain matters, their freedom to speak
freely on such questions without reprisal is “essential.”120 Professors as
a class have such essential interests in their speech when they teach and
publish on matters of public concern, for they exist to educate the electorate on subjects specifically related to their expertise.
Professors serve a unique and vital role in our society: They search
for truth and share it with the public. Their basic function is to “critical[ly] inquir[e] [into] subjects within their scholarly expertise and [ ]
disseminat[e] the results of their scholarship through teaching and publication . . . .”121 They must “constantly striv[e] towards ‘truth’ in [their]
discipline” by “generat[ing] better teaching and scholarship.”122 Unlike
many outside the university, professors’ exploration of ideas is not to be
tainted by motives such as profit-building or policymaking.123 Rather,
their exploration is disinterested and detached; they “follow truth wherever it may lead.”124 Professors’ academic speech thus distinctly advances the pursuit of truth and directly contributes to the goal of an
ployee’s interest in speech on a matter of public concern against the employer’s interest in
providing efficient government services.
119 Pickering, 391 U.S. at 571–72; see also McVey v. Stacy, 157 F.3d 271, 277 (4th Cir.
1998) (“Protection of the public interest in having debate on matters of public importance is at
the heart of the First Amendment, and, indeed, speech concerning public affairs is the essence
of self-government.”).
120 Pickering, 391 U.S. at 572.
121 Rabban, supra note 53, at 241.
122 Nugent & Flood, supra note 9, at 151.
123 Byrne, supra note 52, at 333–34 (“[T]he university is the preeminent institution in our
society where knowledge and understanding are pursued with detachment or disinterestedness.
Outside the university, people generally shape or criticize ideas to make money or influence
public policy; this is preeminently the case with the mass media, the most powerful forum in
which the exchange of ideas takes place.”).
124 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William Roscoe (Dec. 27, 1820), in 15 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 302, 303 (Andrew A. Lipscomb & Albert Ellery Bergh eds.,
1905).
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informed public.125 These are core values the First Amendment was designed to protect.126
That the professors’ pursuit requires freedom is “almost self-evident.”127 They cannot fulfill their noble educational duty “if the conditions for the practice of a responsible and critical mind are denied to
them.”128 “Scholarship cannot flourish in an atmosphere of suspicion
and distrust.”129 The research process requires expansive breathing room
and the liberty to fail and try again. What teacher would boldly explore
ideas if this journey could cost her her job? When “publish and perish”
becomes the unspoken university motto, all but the most daring professors will follow the argument where it leads.
Likewise, teaching cannot be effective where fear of official reprisal
“cast[s] a pall of orthodoxy”130 over the free exchange of ideas in the
classroom. Education is an “inherently expressive enterprise [that] requires its participants to engage in speech and expressive conduct.”131
Teachers, particularly, must be free to communicate between and among
themselves, students, and the larger community.132 It is unreasonable to
ask professors to share their knowledge with their students and with society if the state can punish them for doing so.
University professors thus play a unique role in educating their students and ultimately the public in their area of expertise. They directly
contribute to “free and open debate” on a myriad of scientific, political,
religious, sociological, and philosophical matters so that the electorate
125 See American Association of University Professors (AAUP), 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure, http://www.aaup.org/file/1940%20Statement.pdf
(“Institutions of higher education are conducted for the common good and not to further the
interest of either the individual teacher or the institution as a whole. The common good depends upon the free search for truth and its free exposition. Academic freedom is essential to
these purposes and applies to both teaching and research. Freedom in research is fundamental
to the advancement of truth. Academic freedom in its teaching aspect is fundamental for the
protection of the rights of the teacher in teaching and of the student to freedom in learning. It
carries with it duties correlative with rights.”).
126 Adler v. Bd. of Educ., 342 U.S. 485, 511 (1952) (Douglas, J., dissenting); see also
Red Lion Broad. Co., v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) (“It is the purpose of the First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail.”).
127 Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957); see also BOK, supra note 56, at
358 (“Guaranteeing the freedom of faculty members to speak and write as they choose must
presumably be a [necessary ingredient for creating an environment conducive to inspiring creative thought]. . . . [O]ne must assume that restrictions on speech and thought will inhibit other
creative minds from contributing all they might to human knowledge and understanding. As a
result, freedom of expression is properly thought to be indispensable to academic life in
America and has been respected as such for almost a century.”).
128 Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 196 (1952).
129 Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 250.
130 Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967).
131 Scott R. Bauries & Patrick Schach, Coloring Outside the Lines: Garcetti v. Ceballos in
the Federal Appellate Courts, 262 ED. LAW REP. 357, 359 (2011).
132 Id.
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can make informed decisions on the important policy matters of the
day.133 Moreover, they rely on the First Amendment to protect the
teaching and scholarship that makes this education possible. While the
First Amendment surely protects freedom of thought and expression for
all, “none needs it more than the teacher.”134 Consequently, when
professors teach and publish on matters of public concern, they have an
especially weighty interest in such academic speech. That interest must
be accounted for in the Pickering balance.135
2. Society’s Interest in Core Academic Speech
The Supreme Court has recognized that First Amendment interests
beyond those of the speaker are also at stake.136 Accordingly, the Pickering balance must also promote the “public’s interest in receiving the
well-informed views of government employees engaging in civic discussion.”137 Society itself is heavily invested in professors’ teaching and
scholarship. In particular, society thrives upon the knowledge created
both inside and outside the classroom.138 Every day, university faculty
yield new discoveries in the natural sciences that help solve many of the
great problems facing the world. For example, their research does much
to cure and prevent diseases, address pollution, and increase food pro133

Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 571–72 (1968).
Adler v. Bd. of Educ., 342 U.S. 485, 508 (1952) (Douglas, J., dissenting). It is noteworthy that most of the successful plaintiffs in the Supreme Court’s landmark public employee
speech cases were teachers. See generally Givhan v. W. Line Consol. Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410
(1979); Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977); Perry v.
Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593 (1972); Pickering, 391 U.S. 563; Keyishian, 385 U.S. 589; Shelton v.
Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957); Wieman v.
Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952).
135 Tepper & White, supra note 9, at 165 (“Research and publication further a core function of the university: knowledge creation. Teaching involves another core function: knowledge dissemination. These functions suggest that academic professionals are treated
differently.”).
136 Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 419 (2006).
137 Id.; see also BOK, supra note 56, at 369 (“The informed opinion that professors can
bring to public debate about important national issues is vital to a healthy democracy.”);
Spurgeon, supra note 11, at 407 (“[A] foundational pillar of First Amendment protection for
public employee speech is ‘the importance of promoting the public’s interest in receiving the
well-informed views of government employees engaging in civic discussion.’”).
138 See BOK, supra note 56, at 1 (“In the modern world, colleges and universities have
assumed an importance far beyond their role in earlier times. They are now the country’s chief
supplier of three ingredients essential to national progress—new discoveries in science, technology, and other fields of inquiry; expert knowledge of the kind essential to the work of most
important institutions; and well-trained adults with the skills required to practice the professions, manage a wide variety of organizations, and perform an increasing proportion of the
more demanding jobs in an advanced, technologically sophisticated economy.”). See generally UNIVERSITY-DISCOVERIES, http://university-discoveries.com/ (last visited Oct. 1, 2015).
This resource contains “thousands of discoveries, inventions, innovations, devices, concepts,
techniques, and tools that were born at great American universities.” Id.
134
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duction.139 Likewise, professors’ research in the social sciences provides
the public with insight into the nature of man and society in the hope of
addressing such cultural ills as crime, inequality, and poverty.140 And
society has relied upon universities more and more to drive the nation’s
innovation and research:
Today, universities perform 56 percent of all basic research, compared to 38 percent in 1960. Moreover, universities are increasingly passing on these results to the
private sector: Between 1991 and 2009, the number of
patent applications filed by universities increased from
14 per institution to 68 per institution; licensing income
increased from $1.9 million per institution to $13 million
per institution; and new start-ups formed as a result of
university research increased from 212 in 1994 to 685 in
2009.141
Society’s vital interest in the fruits of professors’ teaching and research is
evident.142
But professors provide another foundational benefit to our society:
They lead the culture by providing training that facilitates self-governance.143 Professor Byrne’s insights on this training function are worth
repeating. In his view, the faculty member’s “careful [and] critical . . .
method of discourse . . . creates the most favorable environment in which
thinkers may formulate ideas that stand apart from popular opinion or
139

Byrne, supra note 52, at 337.
See Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 261 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)
(“Progress in the natural sciences is not remotely confined to findings made in the laboratory.
Insights into the mysteries of nature are born of hypothesis and speculation. The more so is
this true in the pursuit of understanding in the groping endeavors of what are called the social
sciences, the concern of which is man and society. The problems that are the respective preoccupations of anthropology, economics, law, psychology, sociology and related areas of scholarship are merely departmentalized dealing, by way of manageable division of analysis, with
interpenetrating aspects of holistic perplexities.”); see also Education for Sustainable Development, UNESCO, http://www.unesco.org/new/en/education/themes/leading-the-internationalagenda/education-for-sustainable-development/education-for-sustainable-development (last
visited Apr. 8, 2016) (quoting Nelson Mandela: “Education is the most powerful weapon
which you can use to change the world.”).
141 ROBERT D. ATKINSON & LUKE A. STEWART, INFO. TECH. & INNOVATION FOUND.,
UNIVERSITY RESEARCH FUNDING: THE UNITED STATES IS BEHIND AND FALLING 3 (2011).
142 BOK, supra note 56, at 1 (“[Universities] supply the knowledge and ideas that create
new industries, protect us from disease, preserve and enrich our culture, and inform us about
our history, our environment, our society and ourselves.”).
143 Alan K. Chen, Bureaucracy and Distrust: Germaneness and the Paradoxes of the
Academic Freedom Doctrine, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 955, 963 (2006) (“One could argue that
universities encourage and develop critical thinking processes in their students and the ability
to challenge accepted wisdom, which leads not only to a better educated citizenry but also
meaningfully facilitates self-governance in a democratic society.”).
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fashionable error.”144 Moreover, by critically examining knowledge past
and present, faculty instill in students a capacity for “mature and independent judgment.”145 Such critical discourse and judgment are necessary for a culture that hopes to sustain a representative government like
our own:
That our democracy ultimately rests on public opinion is
a platitude of speech but not a commonplace in action.
Public opinion is the ultimate reliance of our society
only if it be disciplined and responsible. It can be disciplined and responsible only if habits of open-mindedness
and of critical inquiry are acquired in the formative years
of our citizens. The process of education has naturally
enough been the basis of hope for the perdurance of our
democracy on the part of all our great leaders, from
Thomas Jefferson onwards. To regard teachers—in our
entire educational system, from the primary grades to the
university—as the priests of our democracy is therefore
not to indulge in hyperbole.146
And, as Thomas Jefferson affirmed in America’s charter, our republic
was instituted to secure the “unalienable rights” of mankind.147 So it is
also no exaggeration to regard professors as the guardians of our liberties.148 These lofty accolades reflect the ancient knowledge of King Solomon, who also confirmed the role of scholars as cultural leaders in
144 Byrne, supra note 52, at 334. Professor Byrne is one of the leading experts on issues
related to academic freedom. Though I agree with his apt description of the training function
of the university, we ultimately disagree on the judicial standard for professors’ speech retaliation claims for the reasons discussed in this Part and Part III.B.
145 Id. at 335.
146 Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 196 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); see also
BOK, supra note 56, at 1 (“[Universities] help to strengthen our democracy by educating its
future leaders, preparing students to be active, knowledgeable citizens, and offering informed
critiques of government programs and policies.”).
147 DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE ¶ 2 (1776) (“We hold these Truths to be self-evident,
that all Men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable
Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness. That to secure these
Rights, Governments are instituted among Men . . . .”).
148 See JMU Reports, JAMES MADISON UNIV., https://www.jmu.edu/jmureports/index
.shtml (last visited Apr. 8, 2016) (quoting James Madison: “The advancement and diffusion of
knowledge is the only guardian of true liberty.”); More Quotes by John F. Kennedy, FORBES
QUOTES, http://www.forbes.com/quotes/author/john-f-kennedy/ (last visited Apr. 8, 2016)
(quoting John F. Kennedy: “Liberty without learning is always in peril, and learning without
liberty is always in vain.”); NUHA FOUND., http://www.nuhafoundation.org/home/blog/blogg
ingentries/2011/general/only_the_educated_are_free_epictetus_e_mnonjela#.VrpocMu4nfY
(last visited Apr. 8, 2016) (quoting Epictetus: “Only the educated are free.”); THOMAS JEFFERSON FOUND., https://www.monticello.org/site/jefferson/if-we-are-guard-against-ignorance-quo
tation (last visited Apr. 8, 2016) (quoting Thomas Jefferson: “If a nation expects to be ignorant
and free in a state of civilization, it expects what never was and never will be.”).
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society: “The words of the wise are like goads, and the words of scholars
are like well-driven nails, given by one Shepherd.”149
Society is therefore deeply invested in both the discoveries and the
training professors provide in their roles as teachers and scholars. Indeed, these citizen-servants grant the public access to new technology
and ideas and also prepare its citizens to participate in robust debate on
matters of public importance, both of which are fundamental First
Amendment values.150 Therefore, when a professor teaches and publishes, both he and society have substantial interests in his speech. These
interests should weigh in favor of the professor in the Pickering balance.
3. The State University’s Interest in Restricting Core Academic
Speech
The state’s interests in providing efficient services to the public
must also be considered in the Pickering balance, but these functional
interests are minimized in the academic context. Because controversy is
inherent in the university’s distinct educational mission, the university is
“less likely to suffer a disruption in its provision of services” due to controversial speech than other public entities.151
The Supreme Court has clarified that the “extra power the government has [to limit its employees’ speech] comes from the nature of the
government’s mission as employer”152:
Government agencies are charged by law with doing
particular tasks. Agencies hire employees to help do
these tasks as effectively and efficiently as possible.
When someone who is paid a salary so that she will contribute to an agency’s effective operations begins to say
or do things that detract from the agency’s effective operation, the government employer must have some
power to restrain her.153
The state’s power to restrict employee speech is thus justified only to the
extent necessary to keep its employees in line with the agency’s mission.
Control and mission are directly related. Accordingly, an employee who
149

Ecclesiastes 12:11.
See Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957) (plurality of the Court
explaining that professors play a “vital role in [our] democracy” by “guid[ing] and train[ing]
our youth” and by making new discoveries; see also Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563,
573 (1968) (describing the “public interest in having free and unhindered debate on matters of
public importance” as “the core value of the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment”).
151 See Mills v. Steger, 64 F. App’x 864, 872 (4th Cir. 2003).
152 Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 674 (1994) (emphasis added).
153 Id. at 674–75.
150
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speaks on a matter of public concern is only subject to those speech restrictions that prevent disruption of the employer’s mission.154
This principle has naturally led the courts to apply varying levels of
First Amendment scrutiny, depending upon the government institution at
issue. For example, speech restrictions enacted by the military are subject to more deference to facilitate “the primary business of armies and
navies to . . . fight wars.”155 Likewise, courts have given more leeway to
speech regulations enacted by prison officials156 and public safety officials157 to accommodate the unique missions of their respective institutions. The same principle warrants that the courts apply stricter scrutiny
to university speech restrictions, given the academy’s unique mission158:
Universities serve a different function than any other
governmental institution or any other governmental employer. They exist for the purpose of creating and disseminating knowledge. They are created as institutions
of both teaching and research, which advance social interests in producing educated citizens and increasing understanding across multiple academic disciplines.159
When professors teach and publish, they presumptively advance the core
functions of the university: knowledge creation and knowledge dissemination. Because the mission of the public university is promoted—not
disrupted—when a professor teaches and publishes, the institution has a
minimal interest in restricting such speech. To permit public universities
to freely regulate professors’ core academic speech would achieve the
perverse result of silencing ideas in the very heart of the “marketplace of
154 Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 419 (2006) (“So long as employees are speaking as
citizens about matters of public concern, they must face only those speech restrictions that are
necessary for their employers to operate efficiently and effectively.”); see also Ridpath v. Bd.
of Governors, 447 F.3d 292, 317 (4th Cir. 2006) (“For Pickering balancing ‘we must take into
account the context of the employee’s speech’ and ‘the extent to which it disrupts the operation and mission’ of the institution.”); Cockrel v. Shelby Cty. Sch. Dist., 270 F.3d 1036, 1053
(6th Cir. 2001) (“In striking the balance between the State’s and the employee’s respective
interests, this court has stated that it will ‘consider whether an employee’s comments meaningfully interfere with the performance of her duties [or] undermine a legitimate goal or mission
of the employer.’”).
155 Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 743 (1974) (citation omitted).
156 Rabban, supra note 53, at 230–31 (“Courts have increasingly observed that the level
of [F]irst [A]mendment protection varies with the functions of institutions. Newspapers and
libraries, for example, are subject to very different [F]irst [A]mendment standards than military bases and prisons.”).
157 Goldstein v. Chestnut Ridge Volunteer Fire Co., 218 F.3d 337, 354–55 (4th Cir. 2000)
(noting that the interest in camaraderie and efficiency in a fire company merited “substantial
weight”).
158 Christian Legal Soc’y v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 685–86 (2010) (“‘First Amendment
rights,’ we have observed, ‘must be analyzed in light of the special characteristics of the
school environment.’”).
159 Chen, supra note 143, at 964.
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ideas.”160 This, in turn, “would effectively deprive the larger community, as well as the academic world, of that information and expertise
which university professors are best equipped to derive from their scholarship and research within their academic disciplines.”161 Such an interpretation of the First Amendment would undercut the very raison d’être
of the public university.
Of course, universities need to be efficient as well. But it bears
emphasis that “their primary goals are research and teaching, not the delivery of services to the general public.”162 So professors presumptively
further the university’s educational mission even when their teaching and
scholarship would be deemed controversial or disruptive in other contexts. Indeed, the search for knowledge presupposes a measure of “disruption.”163 For “[s]cientific and philosophical discoveries can be tested,
verified and perfected, or analytical rashness rendered innocuous, and
error exposed, only by the collision of mind with mind, and knowledge
with knowledge.”164 Even the ancients recognized that knowledge is refined when “iron sharpens iron.”165 Accordingly, “[d]ebate that might be
viewed as disruptive in other public agencies is an accepted, and even
necessary, part of the production of new knowledge and its dissemination
in classrooms.”166 Consequently, public universities must not only tolerate but embrace such rigorous exchange of ideas. In fact, it is the very
“business of a university to provide that atmosphere which is most conducive to speculation, experiment and creation.”167 Censorship of
professors’ teaching or scholarship is indeed the antithesis of the university’s mission and the First Amendment.168 The university that seeks to
control its professors’ academic speech in this manner should find no
solace in the Pickering balance. Instead, the balance should weigh
against that university.

160 Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (“The classroom is peculiarly
the ‘marketplace of ideas.’”) (citations omitted).
161 Robert M. O’Neill, Academic Speech in the Post-Garcetti Environment, 7 FIRST
AMEND. L. REV. 1, 20 (2008).
162 Areen, supra note 9, at 990.
163 See BOK, supra note 56, at 137 (“[T]he university is inherently a disruptive force.”).
164 Nugent & Flood, supra note 9, at 151.
165 Proverbs 27:17.
166 Areen, supra note 9, at 990.
167 Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 263 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
168 Bonnell v. Lorenzo, 241 F.3d 800, 823 (6th Cir. 2001) (“Constitutional protection is
afforded to the open and robust expression and communication of ideas, opinions, and information to further [First Amendment] objectives. This protection parallels a central mission of
higher education: to nurture and preserve a learning environment that is characterized by competing ideas, openly discussed and debated.”).
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B. Precedent Applying Heightened Scrutiny to Professor Speech
Claims
This position is consistent with several First Amendment rulings in
the academic context. Indeed, the Supreme Court itself implicitly struck
this balance in Keyishian. There, the state and the university system enacted a regulatory scheme to control the qualifications of its teachers and
thereby prevent the subversion of the educational system.169 The dissent
characterized the laws as a means of “self-preservation” both for the educational system and, in turn, for the “future of our land.”170 The Supreme Court had previously labeled such interests as “vital” state
concerns.171 The Keyishian majority conceded that these interests were
“substantial,”172 but reaffirmed that even such important governmental
interests could not be pursued by expansive means “when the end can be
more narrowly achieved.”173 The “standards of permissible statutory
vagueness are strict in the area of free expression.”174 New York State
University’s regulations could not stand as written because they broadly
stifled the professors’ “most precious freedoms.”175 The Court’s reasoning echoes heightened First Amendment scrutiny, which requires the
government to narrowly tailor its speech restrictions to accomplish an
important or compelling governmental interest.176 The University regulations failed this standard.177 While the Court did not expressly invoke
the Pickering balance—for it did not deliver that opinion until the following year—its decision foreshadowed Pickering by finding the University’s interests insufficiently tailored to outweigh the professors’ right
to academic speech.178
This stricter standard is internally consistent with other aspects of
the Keyishian Court’s holding. The Court went beyond simply finding
the regulatory scheme to be unconstitutionally vague. It wholly condemned the scheme as fatally overbroad because of its chilling effect on
169

See Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 601 (1967).
Id. at 628 (Clark, J., dissenting).
171 Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 485 (1960) (“There can be no doubt of the right of a
State to investigate the competence and fitness of those whom it hires to teach in its schools, as
this Court before now has had occasion to recognize. ‘A teacher works in a sensitive area in a
schoolroom. There he shapes the attitudes of young minds towards the society in which they
live. In this, the state has a vital concern.’”).
172 Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 602.
173 Id.
174 Id. at 604 (emphasis added).
175 Id. at 603–04.
176 See Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2226 (2015).
177 Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 603–04 (1967) (citations omitted) (“‘Because First Amendment freedoms need breathing space to survive, government may regulate in the area only with
narrow specificity.’ New York’s complicated and intricate scheme plainly violates that
standard.”).
178 Id. at 604.
170
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core academic speech.179 The Court explained, in detail, how the regulations would deter all but the boldest professors from speaking freely in
their classrooms and publications.180 Professors in the New York State
University system would surely not teach or publish zealously when they
could be punished for expressions of mere abstract doctrine181 or belief.182 Teaching and scholarship “cannot flourish in an atmosphere of
suspicion and distrust.”183 Preventing this chilling effect was thus central to the Court’s ruling.
The Court’s condemnation did not stop there. The Court asserted
that in addition to the deficiencies of vagueness and overbreadth, the
University’s regulations cast a “pall of orthodoxy over the classroom.”184
The First Amendment precludes any state university from enforcing—or
even appearing to enforce—a particular “belief or way of thinking that is
accepted as true or correct.”185 This restriction recognizes the limits of
state authority as well as the reality that mankind has not fully comprehended any field of education.186 Such state regulation of professors’
work would hamstring their effectiveness as educators and ultimately
“imperil the future of our Nation.”187 The New York State University
system “plainly”188 could not bear the weight of the judicial burden the
Court imposed upon it.
179 Id. (“‘Because First Amendment freedoms need breathing space to survive, government may regulate in the area only with narrow specificity.’ New York’s complicated and
intricate scheme plainly violates that standard. When one must guess what conduct or utterance may lose him his position, one necessarily will ‘steer far wider of the unlawful zone . . . .’
For ‘the threat of sanctions may deter . . . almost as potently as the actual application of
sanctions.’ The danger of that chilling effect upon the exercise of vital First Amendment
rights must be guarded against by sensitive tools which clearly inform teachers what is being
proscribed.”).
180 See supra Part II.A (discussing the effect of the regulations upon teaching and scholarship); Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 601 (“The very intricacy of the plan and the uncertainty as to the
scope of its proscriptions make it a highly efficient in terrorem mechanism. It would be a bold
teacher who would not stay as far as possible from utterances or acts which might jeopardize
his living by enmeshing him in this intricate machinery. The uncertainty as to the utterances
and acts proscribed increases that caution in ‘those who believe the written law means what it
says.’ The result must be to stifle ‘that free play of the spirit which all teachers ought especially to cultivate and practice.’” (citations omitted)).
181 Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 599.
182 Id. at 600.
183 Id. at 603.
184 Id.
185 See Orthodoxy, MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-web
ster.com/dictionary/orthodoxy (last visited Apr. 8, 2016).
186 See Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 603 (“No field of education is so thoroughly comprehended
by man that new discoveries cannot yet be made. Particularly is that true in the social sciences, where few, if any, principles are accepted as absolutes.”).
187 Id. at 603.
188 Id. at 604.
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A proper balance under Pickering must also incorporate this judicial
burden. A balancing test favoring the university’s interests over the professor’s speech—or even one that balanced them equivalently—would
entirely ignore the Court’s concerns. A close-call, post hoc legal balance
does not lead to inspired teaching and research.189 The professor must be
assured beforehand that she is free to speak, and heightened First
Amendment scrutiny gives her that assurance.
The federal courts of appeals that have addressed the issue specifically have also found university interests wanting in the Pickering balance.190 As discussed in Part II.B, the Sixth Circuit has held that
Jefferson Community College could not, consistent with the First
Amendment, discipline Professor Hardy for using offensive language as
part of his classroom instruction.191 The College had asserted that
Hardy’s teaching created both an actual and potential interference with
the school’s operations. First, the College claimed—and the court accepted—that Hardy’s speech created actual and substantial disharmony
with the administration.192 Typically, the Sixth Circuit and other federal
circuit courts have held that such disharmony weighs against the employee in the Pickering balance.193 In this case, however, the court
found that the friction with the College’s administration did not “impede[ ] [Hardy’s] proper performance of his daily duties in the classroom
or . . . interfere[ ] with the regular operation of the school[ ] generally.”194 So Hardy’s “disruption” did not, as a matter of law, interrupt
the learning process.195
The College countered that Hardy’s racially charged publications
potentially threatened enrollment numbers by creating negative publicity
189 See BOK, supra note 56, at 360–61 (“[P]rofessors are still not entirely sure how much
protection academic freedom provides; in particular, its application to what instructors say in
the classroom remains a murky area with few clear precedents.”). Given this fogginess in the
law, it is unsurprising when Bok reports that “more than half of the faculty in research universities do not now believe that ‘the administration at your institution supports academic freedom.’” Id. at 361.
190 See Cohen v. San Bernardino Valley Coll., 92 F.3d 968, 971–72 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that a college violated the First Amendment when it disciplined a tenured professor under
the school’s sexual harassment policy). The court did not conduct any balancing of interests,
but rather concluded that the policy was unconstitutionally vague as applied to the professor’s
in-class comments. Id.
191 Hardy v. Jefferson Cmty. Coll., 260 F.3d 671, 682 (6th Cir. 2001).
192 Id. at 681.
193 Id. at 680–81 (“Pickering counsels that courts should consider whether an employee’s
comments meaningfully interfere with the performance of his duties or with the employer’s
general operations, undermine a legitimate goal or mission of the employer, create disharmony
among coworkers, undercut an immediate supervisor’s discipline over the employee, or destroy the relationship of loyalty and trust required of confidential employees.”).
194 Id. at 681 (quoting Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 572–73 (1968)).
195 As discussed in Part V.A., a professor does not have a First Amendment right to stall
the educational process.
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for the school.196 Outside the university context this argument might
have prevailed, as the federal courts have “consistently given greater deference to government predictions of harm used to justify restriction of
employee speech.”197 Here, however, the Sixth Circuit found the College’s prediction to be nothing more than the “undifferentiated fear” of
disturbance, which is never sufficient to overcome the freedom of expression.198 Thus, the court of appeals ruled against the College under
circumstances that would normally have yielded a victory for other government employers. Hardy demonstrates that the Pickering balance must
be applied to fit the unique mission and circumstances of the academy.
In this context, college claims of actual and potential disruption do not
receive as much weight as they might in other employment scenarios.
The Levin decision, discussed in Part II.B, demonstrates just how
far this principle can extend. There, the Second Circuit held that the
First Amendment prohibited college officials from threatening to discipline Professor Levin for authoring controversial publications.199 The
court’s decision is significant because both sides conceded that protests
against Professor Levin’s racial theories led to some actual class disruption.200 The record at the district court level documented at least three
occasions in which vocal student demonstrations interrupted Professor
Levin’s and other professors’ classes.201 In other circumstances, such
disruption would have resulted in an easy win for the state employer,
because the government’s interests are at their zenith when the employee’s speech disrupts the government’s provision of services. In fact,
actual disruption is not necessary; the employer need only reasonably
forecast disruption of government services to prevail in the Pickering
balance.202 Yet the Second Circuit not only ruled in favor of Professor
Levin, it actually considered the College’s failure to control the student
196

Hardy, 260 F.3d at 681.
Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 673 (1994).
198 Hardy, 260 F.3d at 682 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S.
503, 508 (1969)).
199 Levin v. Harleston, 966 F.2d 85, 87 (2d Cir. 1992).
200 Id. at 90 (“Appellants’ final disputed response to Professor Levin’s writings was one
of inaction rather than action, i.e., their alleged failure to take steps to prevent what they
themselves describe as ‘undisputed facts concerning disruptions’ of Levin’s classes.”).
201 Specifically, the district court opinion cited the following disruptive incidents: On
April 8, 1987, a group of students conducted a loud demonstration outside of Professor Levin’s
class which disrupted his and other nearby classes; in March of 1989, Professor Levin was
forced to cancel class when about twenty students burst into his classroom chanting and shouting, led by one student with a bullhorn; and in March of 1990, about thirty-five students
entered Professor Levin’s classroom, surrounded his students, and shouted so loudly that
teaching became impossible. Levin v. Harleston, 770 F. Supp. 895, 903–05 (S.D.N.Y. 1991),
order aff’d in part, vacated in part, 966 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1992).
202 Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 152 (1983) (“Furthermore, we do not see the necessity for an employer to allow events to unfold to the extent that the disruption of the office and
the destruction of working relationships is manifest before taking action.”).
197
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protests as a possible stand-alone speech violation.203 The court refused
to go this far, but the power of its holding is unmistakable. Even in the
face of actual class disruption, the court gave greater weight to Professor
Levin’s academic speech than to the government’s interest in restraining
it. To be sure, the employee speech doctrine does not (and should not)
permit a professor to disrupt the educational process. But the disruption
inquiry is far less deferential to the university than it is in non-academic
settings.
IV. THE PROPOSAL

IN

PRACTICE

These cases affirm the novel proposal of this Article that a proper
application of the Pickering balance should be weighted in favor of the
public university professor when she teaches or publishes on a matter of
public concern. Accordingly, a court hearing a professor’s claim that her
university retaliated against her because of speech related to her classroom instruction or academic scholarship should apply the Pickering
framework in the following manner.
The court must first ask whether the professor spoke as a citizen on
a matter of public concern. This threshold inquiry should not include the
“official duties” inquiry because the application of that standard would
defeat virtually all such claims, in contradiction to Keyishian and other
precedents discussed above.204 The court instead must examine the
“content, form and context”205 of the professor’s statement to determine
whether the statement referred to a matter of public concern or a matter
of personal interest.206 If the latter, the analysis ends. If the former, the
court should proceed to balance the professor’s interest in her speech and
society’s interest in receiving it against the institution’s interest in restricting that speech.207 This step is the focus of this Article. The court
should assess this balance with a presumption in favor of the professor.
The university may rebut this presumption, but it will carry a heavy burden. The policies the university seeks to enforce must be precisely tailored to accomplish a substantial interest. Justice Frankfurter captured
the essence of this burden in his Sweezy concurrence:
For society’s good—if understanding be an essential
need of society—inquiries into these problems, specula203

Levin, 966 F.2d at 90–91.
See supra Part II.
205 Connick, 461 U.S. at 147–48.
206 Id. at 147.
207 Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 420 (2006) (“The Court’s decisions, then, have
sought both to promote the individual and societal interests that are served when employees
speak as citizens on matters of public concern and to respect the needs of government employers attempting to perform their important public functions.”).
204
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tions about them, stimulation in others of reflection upon
them, must be left as unfettered as possible. Political
power must abstain from intrusion into this activity of
freedom, pursued in the interest of wise government and
the people’s well-being, except for reasons that are exigent and obviously compelling.208
If the university fails to rebut this presumption—as it often will—the
court must rule in favor of the professor. As discussed above, this analysis is justified by the professor’s unique truth-seeking and educational
functions, society’s interest in the knowledge she creates, and the state
university’s corresponding mission to facilitate the creation and dissemination of knowledge.
V. CONCEPTUAL CHALLENGES
The proposal for heightened scrutiny is not without its challengers.
Although there are surely many “what-about-the-professor-who” hypotheticals that can be imagined, the most serious counterarguments appear to fall into three categories. The first challenge contends that
heightened scrutiny over teaching and scholarship would actually undercut the university’s mission by immunizing poor teachers from correction. The second counterargument flows from the first and maintains
that academic officials, rather than judges, should make decisions about
the worthiness of a professor’s work product. The third challenge contends that the professor’s core academic speech is government speech,
and thus, she has no constitutional rights with respect to that speech.
These arguments, while reasonable at first glance, lose much of their
force upon closer examination.
A. Catch-22 for the University
Perhaps the most forceful counterargument maintains that public
universities cannot function if they are unable to make content-based
evaluations of their professors’ teaching and scholarship.209 Universities
208

Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 235, 262 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
See Roosevelt III, supra note 9, at 657 (“The point, again, is that the academic environment is one in which assessments of quality are vitally important. There may be no such
thing as a false idea, as far as the First Amendment is concerned, but in reality there is such a
thing as a bad article or a soporific lecture, and schools cannot function if they are denied the
ability to make that judgment.”); Byrne, supra note 52, at 310 (“The First Amendment formally insists upon a complete relativity of value among ideas and expressions in order to
preserve liberty. Imposing such a model on the university would be false and perverse. The
government agents here—faculty and deans—presumptively are competent to judge by academic criteria the value of the speaker’s ideas; if we deny their collective authority we deny
the structural principle of collective scholarship upon which the university is built. To ‘liberate’ the fomenter of innovative scholarship from adverse consequences would introduce a thor209
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require the best and brightest professors to produce the highest quality
instruction and research. As an essential part of this selection process,
“[s]cholars routinely are criticized for the content of their speech by
other scholars, and some are eventually penalized by their institutions.”210 Indeed, it is the academy’s essence to distinguish “worthy
ideas” from “dull” ones and, necessarily, to value some speakers more
than others.211 While this sorting justification appears sufficient at first
blush, it is founded on the faulty supposition that public university officials are incapable of evaluating professorial qualifications without using
speech-discriminatory criteria.
The Fourth Circuit exposed this faulty logic in Adams. The district
court granted summary judgment to UNCW, reasoning that if the First
Amendment protected Adams’s teaching and scholarship, universities
would be placed in a constitutional bind every time they evaluated a professor’s performance:
[E]ither neglect employee requests and refuse to look at
material, fueling allegations of free speech violations
grounded in the refusal; or consider the material, knowing that doing so will open them up, in the event of an
adverse outcome, to claims of free speech violations for
basing denials on protected speech.212
In reversing, the Fourth Circuit concluded that this purported catch-22 is
illusory:
Adams’ inclusion of the speech at issue as part of his
application process asked the Defendants to consider it
not according to the content qua speech, but as factoring
into the sweeping requirements of scholarship and service necessary to support his promotion to full professor.
The Defendants were not precluded from examining the
materials for a permissible purpose using lawful criteria.
At the same time, their review of those materials can be
examined for an impermissible discriminatory use. This
“bind” is no different than the commonplace consideration of criteria that govern all university employment decisions. It does not open the Defendants up to an
oughgoing relativity into scholarly discourse that would destroy categories and disciplines,
based as they are on accepted and identifiable—as well as disputed and changing—
premises.”).
210 Byrne, supra note 52, at 310.
211 Id.
212 Adams v. Trs. of Univ. of N.C.–Wilmington, 640 F.3d 550, 562 (4th Cir. 2011).
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insurmountable dilemma as misidentified by the district
court.213
Thus, a robust First Amendment is “neither a license for unlimited expression nor a basis to permit dysfunctional operations within the institution.”214 The university may appraise professors’ academic speech for
quality, as long as it does not discriminate against professors based upon
its disagreement with their ideas.215
The proponents behind the catch-22 counterargument are obviously
concerned that the First Amendment would shield poor or insubordinate
teachers from proper discipline. But the Adams court made it clear that
public universities may use “lawful criteria” to evaluate and ultimately
terminate unqualified professors.216 The federal courts have spelled out
some of those criteria. For instance, professors must adhere to accepted
professional standards. “[A] professor who plagiarizes a scholarly paper
may be disciplined for a gross violation of professional ethics . . . .”217
Likewise, “[g]rossly inaccurate speech about the Holocaust, for example,
could be cause for dismissing a historian for incompetence.”218 Simi213

Id.
Griffin, supra note 9, at 26; see also Clark v. Holmes, 474 F.2d 928 (7th Cir. 1972)
(“[W]e do not conceive academic freedom to be a license for uncontrolled expression . . .
internally destructive of the proper functioning of the institution.”); Pugel v. Bd. of Trs., 378
F.3d 659, 667 (7th Cir. 2004) (“[T]his court has affirmed the right of members of a university
community to ‘engage in academic debates, pursuits, and inquiries,’ while noting nevertheless
that a public employee’s right to free speech is not absolute.”).
215 Tepper & White, supra note 9, at 166–67 (“[A university] may evaluate the research
and performance of its faculty, but it must do so based on legitimate and professional reasons.
This conforms to well-established institutional norms of academic freedom: ‘teachers are entitled to full freedom in research and in the publication of the results, subject to the adequate
performance of their other academic duties,’ and ‘[t]eachers are entitled to freedom in the
classroom in discussing their subject.’”); see also Areen, supra note 9, at 961 (“In evaluating
the work of other scholars, faculty are expected to judge on the basis of the quality of the
research methodology employed and the arguments presented rather than whether they agree
with the conclusions reached. That is, both a scholar’s work and peer evaluations of it are
supposed to be objective or “disinterested,” to use the terminology of the [1915] Declaration
[of Principles on Academic Freedom and Academic Tenure].”).
216 See Adams, 640 F.3d at 562.
217 Rabban, supra note 53, at 255. See also Pugel, 378 F.3d at 668 (affirming motion to
dismiss where teaching assistant was terminated for knowingly presenting invalid data at an
academic conference).
218 Rabban, supra note 53, at 242. Likewise, a public university could fire a chemistry
professor who teaches alchemy to his students. The university may discipline the Holocaust
denier and the alchemist because they are teaching factually false information which is not
protected by the First Amendment in other contexts. For example, this standard is already
utilized in the defamation context where “statements on matters of public concern must be
provable as false before there can be liability under state defamation law.” Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 19 (1990). Conversely, “a statement of opinion relating to matters of public concern which does not contain a provably false factual connotation will receive
full constitutional protection.” Id. at 20. This standard could easily be imported into the public university context to permit schools to discipline professors who teach or publish “provably
false” information.
214
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larly, a public university may “terminate a teacher [whose] teaching
methods . . . do not conform with those approved by the university.”219
Simply put, the First Amendment does not force the university to compromise professional standards.220
The federal judiciary has also recognized that the university has a
strong interest in implementing its curriculum.221 The institution may
thus require the professor to teach a certain course and to stay on
topic.222 Accordingly, “[n]o college or university is required to allow a
chemistry professor to devote extensive classroom time to the teaching of
James Joyce’s demanding novel Ulysses, nor must it permit a professor
of mathematics to fill her class hours with instruction on the law of
219 Hetrick v. Martin, 480 F.2d 705, 708 (6th Cir. 1973) (upholding state university’s
decision not to rehire untenured professor due to her unapproved teaching methods); see also
Bradley v. Pittsburgh Bd. of Educ., 910 F.2d 1172, 1176 (3d Cir. 1990) (upholding high
school’s decision to ban “Learnball” classroom teaching method); Ahern v. Bd. of Educ., 456
F.2d 399 (8th Cir. 1972) (holding that high school teacher discharged for introducing methods
very similar to Learnball had no right to use methods in contravention of school policy).
220 Of course, this assumes the college is not applying the standard in a discriminatory
manner. Public schools may not use professional standards as a pretext for unlawful discrimination. For example, in Ward v. Polite, 667 F.3d 727 (6th Cir. 2012), the Sixth Circuit reversed summary judgment where there was evidence that the university imposed a standard of
counseling ethics on the plaintiff-student due to hostility to her religious beliefs. Ward, 667
F.3d at 738 (“Many of the faculty members’ statements to Ward raise a similar concern about
religious discrimination. A reasonable jury could find that the university dismissed Ward from
its counseling program because of her faith-based speech, not because of any legitimate pedagogical objective.”). Additionally, the Third Circuit recognized that professional ethics codes
do not relieve public school officials of their duties under the Constitution. See Gruenke v.
Seip, 225 F.3d 290, 307 (3d Cir. 2000) (“Because public school officials are state actors, they
must not lose sight of the fact that their professional association ethical codes, as well as state
statutes, must yield to the Constitution.”).
221 See, e.g., Keen v. Penson, 970 F.2d 252, 257 (7th Cir. 1992) (“This Court has recognized the supremacy of the academic institution in matters of curriculum content.”); Piggee v.
Carl Sandburg Coll., 464 F.3d 667, 671 (7th Cir. 2006) (“[W]e have also recognized that a
university’s ‘ability to set a curriculum is as much an element of academic freedom as any
scholar’s right to express a point of view.’”); Kissinger v. Bd. of Trs., 5 F.3d 177, 181 (6th
Cir. 1993) (“Courts have traditionally given public educational institutions, especially colleges
and graduate schools, wide latitude to create curricula that fit schools’ understandings of their
educational missions. We would defeat that longstanding restraint if we ruled for [plaintiff]
today.”). Here, too, it is important to note that the university cannot use the curriculum as a
pretext for discrimination. See Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277, 1293 (10th Cir. 2004)
(“[W]e may override an educator’s judgment where the proffered goal or methodology was a
sham pretext for an impermissible ulterior motive.”).
222 Tepper & White, supra note 9, at 131 (“Moreover, curriculum design is another area
in which the right of the academic institution is very strong, and the institution may insist that
faculty . . . stay on topic . . . .”). Public universities may not, however, punish a professor for
expressing his thoughts on a permissible subject within the course curriculum. See Dube v.
State Univ. of N.Y., 900 F.2d 587 (2d Cir. 1990); see also Hardy v. Jefferson Cmty. Coll., 260
F.3d 671, 680 (6th Cir. 2001); see also Sheldon v. Dhillon, No. C-08-03438 RMW, 2009 WL
4282086, at *4–5 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 25, 2009) (denying motion to dismiss on professor’s speech
retaliation and viewpoint discrimination claims where community college disciplined the professor for her response about the genetic basis of sexual orientation in a course titled “Human
Heredity”).
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torts.”223 Consequently, federal courts have repeatedly rebuffed lawsuits
brought by teachers attempting to dictate the curriculum or course content over the institution’s objections.224 Indeed, “no court has found that
teachers’ First Amendment rights extend to choosing their own
curriculum.”225
And it is self-evident that a professor is not free to invade the constitutional rights of his students. Professors who force students to engage
in religious exercise,226 unlawfully discriminate against students,227 or
compel students to affirm a message with which they disagree228 will
find no refuge from official discipline under the First Amendment. For
similar reasons, a professor may not create a hostile environment that
disrupts the learning process itself.229 The Free Speech Clause is not a
223

Piggee, 464 F.3d at 671.
See id. at 667 (holding that community college had right to insist that cosmetology
instructor refrain from engaging in religious speech during class that was unrelated to the
course content); Boring v. Buncombe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 136 F.3d 364 (4th Cir. 1998) (holding
that high school drama teacher did not have First Amendment right to select particular play
because play was part of the school’s curriculum); Edwards v. Cal. Univ. of Pa., 156 F.3d 488,
491 (3d Cir. 1998) (affirming state university’s imposition of restrictions upon tenured professor’s choice of classroom materials); Bishop v. Aronov, 926 F.2d 1066, 1072 (11th Cir. 1991)
(“Courts agree . . . that the school’s administration may at least establish the parameters of
focus and general subject matter of curriculum.”); Smith v. Kent State Univ., 696 F.2d 476
(6th Cir. 1983) (sustaining dismissal of professor who failed to teach assigned course); Clark
v. Holmes, 474 F.2d at 930–31 (7th Cir. 1972) (upholding state university’s decision not to
rehire instructor who overemphasized sex in required health survey class).
225 Bradley v. Pittsburgh Bd. of Educ., 910 F.2d 1172, 1176 (3d Cir. 1990).
226 Bishop, 926 F.2d at 1076 (upholding state university memo restricting professor from
interjecting religious beliefs into class discussion when unrelated to course subject).
227 Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277, 1282 (10th Cir. 2004) (“[T]eachers should
not punish or reward [students] on the basis of inadmissible factors—race, religion, gender,
political ideology.”) (quoting Settle v. Dickson Cty. Sch. Bd., 53 F.3d 152, 155 (6th Cir.
1995)).
228 See W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (holding that a public
high school may not compel student to say the Pledge of Allegiance because the First Amendment prohibits the state from forcing citizens to affirm messages with which they disagree);
see also Ward v. Polite, 667 F.3d 727, 733-35 (6th Cir. 2012) (holding that a state university
cannot compel graduate counseling student to provide gay-affirming counseling where requirement was motivated by anti-religious bias); Axson-Flynn, 356 F.3d at 1282 (holding that a
state university could not compel a Mormon theater student to speak offensive words in a
script if the script requirement was motivated by anti-religious bias); BOK, supra note 56, at
374 (“Academic freedom does not give license to instructors to impose their own political
views on students or to present only one side of controversial issues. As the American Association of University Professors made clear in their seminal 1915 report defining academic freedom, ‘the teacher must also be especially on his guard against taking unfair advantage of the
student’s immaturity by indoctrinating him with the teacher’s own opinions before the student
has had an opportunity fairly to examine other opinions upon the matter in question and before
he has sufficient knowledge and ripeness of judgment to form any definitive opinion of his
own.’”). See generally Martins, supra note 13, at 192.
229 See Hardy v. Jefferson Cmty. Coll., 260 F.3d 671, 681 (6th Cir. 2001) (“Pickering
counsels, however, that a school’s interest in limiting a teacher’s speech is not great when
those public statements ‘are neither shown nor can be presumed to have in any way either
224
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warrant for professors to use profane,230 racist,231 or sexist language232
without any legitimate academic justification.233 Simply put, the First
Amendment permits the public university to protect its academic integrity by disciplining professors who disregard professional standards, ignore the curriculum, or violate students’ rights. Such discipline is
permissible—assuming it is pursuant to precisely tailored regulations—
because the university has overriding interests in preventing such
behavior.
B. Deference to the Academy
The second major counterargument contends that judges should defer to the university on academic decisions such as the evaluation of the
quality of teaching and research. This deference model is derived from
Regents of the University of Michigan v. Ewing, in which the Supreme
Court upheld a university’s decision to dismiss a student from its medical
program for academic reasons234:
When judges are asked to review the substance of a genuinely academic decision, such as this one, they should
show great respect for the faculty’s professional judgment. Plainly, they may not override it unless it is such
a substantial departure from accepted academic norms as
to demonstrate that the person or committee responsible
did not actually exercise professional judgment.235
impeded the teacher’s proper performance of his daily duties in the classroom or to have
interfered with the regular operation of the schools generally.’”) (quoting Pickering v. Bd. of
Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 572–73 (1968)).
230 See Bonnell v. Lorenzo, 241 F.3d 800, 824 (6th Cir. 2001) (holding that professor
does not have a First Amendment right to use profanity in a classroom setting where such
language is not germane to the course subject matter); Keen v. Penson, 970 F.2d 252 (7th Cir.
1992) (holding that a university’s right to protect students from “demeaning, insulting, and
inappropriate comments” outweighed any First Amendment rights of the professor); Martin v.
Parrish, 805 F.2d 583, 584–85 (5th Cir. 1986) (holding that a professor had no constitutional
right to use profanity that had no legitimate academic purpose).
231 See Dambrot v. Cent. Mich. Univ., 55 F.3d 1177, 1180 (6th Cir. 1995) (holding that
university’s termination of coach did not violate First Amendment because coach’s use of the
word “nigger” in locker room was not speech on a matter of public concern).
232 See Trejo v. Shoben, 319 F.3d 878 (7th Cir. 2003) (upholding university’s decision
not to rehire professor who made sexually charged and demeaning comments to female professors and students at academic conference); see also Davis v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 526
U.S. 629, 633 (1999) (“[Title IX] action will lie only for harassment that is so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it effectively bars the victim’s access to an educational
opportunity or benefit.”).
233 See BOK, supra note 56, at 359 (“While faculty members enjoy broad freedom of
expression, their liberty is not and cannot be absolute. Academic freedom does not protect
professors who insult students in their classes or engage in long harangues about controversial
matters unrelated to the subject of their course.”).
234 Regents of Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214 (1985).
235 Id. at 225.
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This position assumes that judges lack the training and expertise necessary to review purely academic decisions.236 Several scholars have argued that Ewing’s deferential approach is the proper standard for
evaluating all academic decisions rendered by a public university, including those related to a professor’s work product.237 These scholars
point out that, in multiple cases,238 the High Court has cautioned courts
to resist “substitut[ing] their own notions of sound educational policy for
those of . . . the school authorities” which they review.239
This position, however, breaks down when applied to the precise
issue of the university’s authority to regulate professors’ instruction and
research under the Free Speech Clause. As an initial matter, the Supreme
Court formulated the Ewing standard in the context of a public univer236 See id. at 226 (“If a ‘federal court is not the appropriate forum in which to review the
multitude of personnel decisions that are made daily by public agencies,’ far less is it suited to
evaluate the substance of the multitude of academic decisions that are made daily by faculty
members of public educational institutions—decisions that require ‘an expert evaluation of
cumulative information and [are] not readily adapted to the procedural tools of judicial or
administrative decisionmaking.’”).
237 See, e.g., Rabban, supra note 53, at 287 (“Whatever their holdings, these decisions
emphasize that courts should afford broad deference to professional expertise. Academic decisions are necessarily subjective and beyond the competence of judges. Courts cannot become
a ‘Super-Tenure Review Committee’ or ‘evaluate the substance of the multitude of academic
decisions that are made daily by faculty members of public educational institutions.’ Rather,
judges should override ‘a genuinely academic decision’ only if ‘it is such a substantial departure from accepted academic norms as to demonstrate that the person or committee responsible
did not actually exercise professional judgment.’”); Chen, supra note 143, at 979–80 (“That is,
while the law would require a tighter fit between the means (restricting speech) and the ends
(advancement of a specific component of the academic mission), it would not require the
university to show that the interest is an important or compelling one. The importance of the
university’s advancement of the academic mission is understood. So long as the university’s
interest is legitimate (in the same sense as required under a rational basis analysis) in that it
serves to advance the academic mission and is stated at a fairly narrow level of generality, the
court would examine only the germaneness of the restriction.”).
238 Christian Legal Soc’y v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 687 (2010). (“[The university’s]
decisions about the character of its student-group program are due decent respect.”); Grutter v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328 (2003) (“The Law School’s educational judgment that [racial]
diversity is essential to its educational mission is one to which we defer. . . . Our holding today
is in keeping with our tradition of giving a degree of deference to a university’s academic
decisions, within constitutionally prescribed limits.”); Bd. of Curators v. Horowitz, 435 U.S.
78, 89–90 (1978) (“The decision to dismiss respondent, by comparison, rested on the academic
judgment of school officials that she did not have the necessary clinical ability to perform
adequately as a medical doctor and was making insufficient progress toward that goal. Such a
judgment is by its nature more subjective and evaluative than the typical factual questions
presented in the average disciplinary decision. Like the decision of an individual professor as
to the proper grade for a student in his course, the determination whether to dismiss a student
for academic reasons requires an expert evaluation of cumulative information and is not readily adapted to the procedural tools of judicial or administrative decisionmaking. Under such
circumstances, we decline to ignore the historic judgment of educators and thereby formalize
the academic dismissal process by requiring a hearing.”).
239 Martinez, 561 U.S. at 686 (alteration in original) (quoting Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458
U.S. 176, 206 (1982)).
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sity’s judgment of student240—not professor—qualifications. Additionally, the Court’s judgment addressed not a First Amendment claim, but
rather, a claim that the University violated the student’s “substantive
right under the Due Process Clause to continued enrollment free from
arbitrary state action.”241 These points are significant because the Ewing
standard conflicts with the First Amendment standard the Court applied
to the teaching and scholarship regulations in Keyishian.242 There, the
Court refused to defer to the state university’s judgment when that judgment directly restricted the professors’ freedom to teach and publish.243
Since neither Ewing nor any other Supreme Court decision has overturned Keyishian, its heightened scrutiny is the appropriate standard to
apply to professor retaliation claims involving core academic speech.
In addition to this legal flaw, the deference model fails on principled
and pragmatic grounds because it places too much trust in state officials
to regulate speech.244 One scholar described this implicit faith as
follows:
This model relies on a generous amount of trust in the
professional academic judgment of the critical decision
makers in public university settings. These decision
makers include publicly-elected members of boards of
regents, university presidents and provosts, department
chairs, and internal peer reviewer panels made up of individual faculty members. It assumes that such decision
makers, through their professional training and corresponding objectivity, can be trusted in most cases to
make decisions about the quality of a professor’s teaching or research that are legitimate exercises of their professional discipline. In this professional context, this
view suggests that the chances of illicit viewpoint or
content discrimination based on non-academic factors,
such as a professor’s personal political views, are substantially diminished.245
240

See Regents of Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 215–16 (1985).
Id. at 223 (emphasis added).
242 See Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 599–604 (1967).
243 See supra Part III.B; see also Grutter, 539 U.S. at 363–64 (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(“Again, however, the [Keyishian] Court did not relax any independent constitutional restrictions on public universities.”).
244 See Bishop v. Aronov, 926 F.2d 1066, 1075 (11th Cir. 1991) (“[W]e cannot supplant
our discretion for that of the University. Federal judges should not be ersatz deans or educators. In this regard, we trust that the University will serve its own interests as well as those of
its professors in pursuit of academic freedom.”).
245 Chen, supra note 143, at 970.
241
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This assumed trust in public officials, however, clashes with a foundational constitutional principle. The First Amendment is “[p]remised on
mistrust of government power” to regulate ideas.246 Just last year the
Supreme Court reaffirmed this suspicion by ruling that all governmentimposed content-based speech restrictions presumptively violate the
Constitution247 because they “may interfere with . . . the search for
truth.”248 This constitutional mistrust is well-founded in the classroom
of world history. It is common knowledge that tyrannical regimes seek
to consolidate power by controlling their nations’ educational systems
and their teachers. Even the German universities, which were renowned
for their independence, were eventually made tools of the Nazi state.249
And when such governments have consolidated control over the education system, the results have proven disastrous.250 Standing alone, the
collapse of Russian agriculture from “Stalin’s enforcement of Lysenko
biology orthodoxy [over the Russian education system] stand[s] as a
strong counter example to those who would discipline university professors for not following the ‘party line.’”251 Further, we know that the
efforts of the Roman Empire, the Soviet Union, and the Third Reich to
246 Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 340 (2010) (emphasis added); see also Snyder
v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 460–61 (2011) (explaining that the government cannot even censor
speech whose “contribution to public discourse may be negligible” because of the potentially
“stifl[ing effect upon] public debate”); Judge Thomas L. Ambro & Paul J. Safier, The First
Amendment, the Courts, and “Picking Winners,” 87 WASH. L. REV. 397, 399 (2012) (“[T]he
First Amendment is peculiarly concerned with state action. Above all else, the Amendment
expresses a fear of the dangers uniquely associated with government interference in the development and expression of ideas.”).
247 Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2232 (2015) (“Not ‘all distinctions’ are
subject to strict scrutiny, only content-based ones are.” (emphasis in original)).
248 Id. at 2233 (Alito, J., concurring).
249 Matthew W. Finkin, On “Institutional” Academic Freedom, 61 TEX. L. REV. 817,
824–25 (1983) (“It was only with the advent of the Weimar Republic that the professoriate
became aware that much of its autonomy had actually been lost. By that time, the conflict was
between a professoriate and a political system estranged from one another; and by that time the
authority of the state over the universities was too firmly established.”).
250 Id. at 824–25 (“Under National Socialism, state authority would be exercised with a
vengeance and in complete disregard of such autonomy as had theretofore been secured.”); see
S. Hildebrandt, Anatomy in the Third Reich: An Outline, Part 1, 22 CLINICAL ANATOMY 883,
885 (2009) (discussing German universities which responded to Nazi pressure to reorganize
their science curricula in accordance with National Socialist doctrine in a process called “selfalignment”); see also Hundred Flowers Campaign, NEW WORLD ENCYCLOPEDIA (Mar. 27,
2014), http://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Hundred_Flowers_Campaign (discussing
Mao Zedong’s attack on Chinese university professors after they enthusiastically criticized his
regime in response to his invitation to speak freely about their opinions of the government);
Supreme Cultural Revolution Council (SCRC), GLOBALSECURITY.ORG, http://www.globalsecur
ity.org/military/world/iran/scrc.htm (last visited Oct. 29, 2015) (discussing the takeover of Iranian schools by forces loyal to Imam Khomeini who “deleted certain courses such as music as
‘fake knowledge.’ Committees established after the 1979 Revolution came to similar conclusions concerning all subjects in the humanities such as law, political sciences, economy, psychology, education and sociology.”).
251 Kerr v. Hurd, 694 F. Supp. 2d 817, 843–44 (S.D. Ohio 2010).
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stamp out dissent ultimately led to the extermination of the dissenters.252
“Compulsory unification of opinion achieves only the unanimity of the
graveyard.”253 We ignore these lessons from history at our peril.
Deference proponents counter, claiming the unique self-regulating
aspects of the university system justify this additional trust. If this argument was true at one time, the current form of the modern public university warrants against it today. The realities of today’s public colleges
undermine the confidence one should place in university officials to
render objective academic judgments. In many universities, school administrators, rather than academic experts in the relevant field, are the
ones evaluating professor speech.254 And it is increasingly common that
such administrators are not even professional educators.255 Moreover,
the university trustees or regents who make the final decisions about
faculty retention are often elected or otherwise subjected to political
pressure that may influence their review of faculty teaching and scholarship.256 Corporations have also increased their influence over academic
252 W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 641 (1943) (“Ultimate futility of
such attempts to compel coherence is the lesson of every such effort from the Roman drive to
stamp out Christianity as a disturber of its pagan unity, the Inquisition, as a means to religious
and dynastic unity, the Siberian exiles as a means to Russian unity, down to the fast failing
efforts of our present totalitarian enemies.”).
253 Id. at 641.
254 See Chen, supra note 143, at 972 (“[T]he modern university is not your grandparents’
university: ‘the German idea [of academic freedom] was premised upon the university as a
self-governing body of faculty. In America, “the university” encompasses a lay governing
board and its administrative delegates to which the faculty is legally subordinate.’ Accordingly, in many university settings, it is not entirely true that decisions to restrict a professor’s
speech are necessarily being made by experts in her field.”).
255 See id. (“One example of the transformation of the contemporary American university
is that it is increasingly common for universities to hire presidents from a non-academic background. Also . . . trustees or regents, the ultimate decision makers in the hierarchy of university governance, may not even be professional educators, much less in a position to objectively
evaluate a professor’s work.”). While Bok claims that “less than 20 percent of college presidents have had no previous faculty position,” he too ultimately concedes that most presidents
are far removed from the academic realities of university life. BOK, supra note 56, at 49. “The
candidate whom trustees tend to choose is someone who left teaching and research long ago to
become a professional administrator . . . .” Id. at 49. Moreover, presidents “have less and less
time to spend on matters of education and research but must devote almost all of their attention
to financial, administrative, and ceremonial tasks for which their past academic experience has
scarcely prepared them.” Id. Indeed, “[a] survey by the American Council on Education to
determine how presidents spend their day found that academic affairs ranked last in a set of six
familiar types of activity. Id. at 48–49. These statistics do not provide reason to put great
confidence in trustees and presidents to make informed academic decisions about a professor’s
teaching and research.
256 See Chen, supra note 143, at 972 (“Trustees for public universities, moreover, are
elected and may be subject to extreme political pressure when reviewing a professor’s controversial teaching or scholarship.”); see also BOK, supra note 56, at 46 (“At the same time,
trustees are handicapped because they typically lack much experience in academic life and
meet too infrequently to learn a great deal through their membership on the board. . . . In
public universities, the usefulness of the board is frequently impaired by the way in which
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decisions as universities have become increasingly dependent upon corporate dollars in the wake of state budget cuts.257 For these reasons, the
trust implicit in the deference model is questionable at best.
Likewise, due to these realities, it is less than evident why judges
should defer their judgment to that of university officials. Most judges
have advanced degrees themselves, so they are reasonably capable of
understanding and respecting academic norms.258 This training combined with their knowledge of constitutional limits has empowered
judges to become effective at distinguishing between legitimate academic judgments and illicit discriminatory motives.259 Further, the independence of the federal bench makes it uniquely qualified to review
academic decisions.260 Judges are freer to make objective decisions precisely because they are not subject to the political and economic influences that may sway a university official.261 The fact that judges are not
doctors does not prevent them from making rulings in medical malpractice cases. The fact that they are not military experts does not prevent
them from ruling on national security issues, such as detention policies.
Judges do not rule on cases because they are subject matter experts; they
rule on cases because they are judges.262 And the law should apply
trustees are selected. In most states, members are appointed by the governor, sometimes with
the help of recommendations from a panel of advisers. Although many public boards have had
some extremely capable members, especially in matters of finance and dealings with state
governments and other outside groups, governors often appoint persons with limited knowledge of higher education, such as campaign contributors or individuals recommended by political allies, labor unions, business organizations, and other prominent interest groups.”).
257 See Chen, supra note 143, at 972–73 (“Finally, there has been a steady decrease in
public funding as a source for public university revenue, which will inevitably increase the
demand for corporate dollars to make up the difference. The more beholden universities are to
corporate donors, the greater chance that such donors may attempt to wield influence over
academic decisions with which they disagree.”).
258 Byrne, supra note 52, at 336–38 (noting that judges are “sufficiently well qualified” to
review academic decisions due in part to the fact that most have “advanced degrees”).
259 See Chen, supra note 143, at 973 (“What is good or bad, rigorous or not rigorous can
be sorted out through the use of expert testimony, the same way it is in other fields about
which judges know little or nothing. Moreover, while courts may not be experts in academic
standards, they are good, or at least more experienced than other institutions, at one thing—
applying doctrinal tools and evaluating evidence in cases involving disputes about the underlying motivation of potentially bad state actors.”).
260 See id. (“It is not that courts are better than academics at determining what is good
teaching and what is bad or which scholarship is rigorous and which is shoddy. It is that they
have more independence.”).
261 See Byrne, supra note 52, at 336–38 (“Judges are sufficiently well qualified by background (most have advanced degrees), insulated from political buffeting and economic pressures, and familiar with constitutional norms to perceive the special values of a university and
to protect them from legislation.”).
262 See W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639–40 (1943) (“Nor does
our duty to apply the Bill of Rights to assertions of official authority depend upon our possession of marked competence in the field where the invasion of rights occurs. . . . [W]e act in
these matters not by authority of our competence but by force of our commissions. We cannot,
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equally to all state entities. Public universities are not entitled to a “getout-of-jail-free card,” especially in an area fraught with First Amendment
implications. Thus, while the deference opinion has acquired support in
the opinions of some judges and scholars, its foundations are found wanting when applied specifically to teaching and scholarship.
C. Government Speech Doctrine
The government speech doctrine also stands as a challenge to this
Article’s proposal. The doctrine states, “[W]hen the government appropriates public funds to promote a particular policy of its own it is entitled
to say what it wishes.”263 Because a “state-controlled [u]niversity [has
the] right[ ] to use its own funds to advance a particular message,”264 it
may even impose viewpoint-based restrictions to ensure that its message
is not distorted.265 The Supreme Court has even intimated that this principle would apply to the speech of professors.266 Under this reasoning,
public universities effectively “own” the core academic speech of their
professors and can make content-based—or even viewpoint-discriminatory—decisions about instruction and research.
But there are fundamental errors in this categorical approach. This
broad application of the doctrine assumes that the state hires public university professors to produce a particular message. Incidentally, teaching
and scholarship are not paid for exclusively by the state: public universities receive a substantial amount of money in the form of student-paid
because of modest estimates of our competence in such specialties as public education, withhold the judgment that history authenticates as the function of this Court when liberty is
infringed.”).
263 Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995).
264 Bd. of Regents v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 229 (2000).
265 Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 833–34 (1995) (“When the government disburses public
funds to private entities to convey a governmental message, it may take legitimate and appropriate steps to ensure that its message is neither garbled nor distorted by the grantee. It does
not follow, however, and we did not suggest in Widmar, that viewpoint-based restrictions are
proper when the University does not itself speak or subsidize transmittal of a message it favors
but instead expends funds to encourage a diversity of views from private speakers. A holding
that the University may not discriminate based on the viewpoint of private persons whose
speech it facilitates does not restrict the University’s own speech, which is controlled by different principles.”).
266 Southworth, 529 U.S. at 234–35 (“Our decision ought not to be taken to imply that in
other instances the University, its agents or employees, or—of particular importance—its
faculty, are subject to the First Amendment analysis which controls in this case. Where the
University speaks, either in its own name through its regents or officers, or in myriad other
ways through its diverse faculties, the analysis likely would be altogether different. . . . In the
instant case, the speech is not that of the University or its agents. It is not, furthermore, speech
by an instructor or a professor in the academic context, where principles applicable to government speech would have to be considered.”).
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tuition267 and corporate dollars.268 In fact, in 2008, “most of the nation’s
public research universities had more than half of their costs paid by
tuition . . . and other four-year public institutions were hovering near the
50 percent mark.”269 While the Court has not explained how or whether
this “hybrid” funding model affects the government speech doctrine, the
presence of multiple private contributors would seem to lessen the extent
to which the government could dictate its message under the doctrine.
More significantly, the government speech doctrine is only applicable where the government is attempting to speak a “particular message”270—something that does not occur in the context of faculty
academic speech. “[U]niversities do not hire academics to promote a
specific government message. Universities provide funding to academics
to teach and produce scholarship.”271 “The job of faculty is to produce
and disseminate new knowledge and to encourage critical thinking, not
to indoctrinate students with ideas selected by the government.”272 The
multifarious voices of the university’s faculty certainly speak broadly in
support of the school’s academic mission. But it simply strains credulity
to contend that the American university speaks a specific and coherent
message when it is in fact the quintessential “marketplace of ideas.”273
Moreover, the relevant case precedent refutes a categorical application of the government speech doctrine to faculty work product. In its
seminal government speech case, the Supreme Court explained:
267 Spurgeon, supra note 11, at 417 (“Students compete for admission and pay substantial
tuitions.”).
268 See Chen, supra note 143, at 972–73.
269 Tamar Lewin, Public Universities Relying More on Tuition Than State Money, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 24, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/24/education/24tuition.html?_r=1.
270 Southworth, 529 U.S. at 229.
271 Darryn Cathryn Beckstrom, Reconciling the Public Employee Speech Doctrine and
Academic Speech After Garcetti v. Ceballos, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1202, 1227 (2010); see also
Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 437 (2006) (Souter, J., dissenting) (“Some public employees are hired to ‘promote a particular policy’ by broadcasting a particular message set by the
government, but not everyone working for the government, after all, is hired to speak from a
government manifesto.”).
272 Areen, supra note 9, at 991–92.
273 Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967). This conclusion is buttressed
by the Supreme Court’s decision in Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533 (2001). In
Velazquez, the Court addressed the Legal Services Corporation Act, which provided funds to
organizations that offered free legal assistance to indigent clients. Id. at 536. The Act, however, prohibited “legal representation funded by recipients of LSC moneys if the representation
involves an effort to amend or otherwise challenge existing welfare law.” Id. at 537–38. Various lawyers challenged the restriction on the grounds that it violated their right to free speech
by preventing them from arguing that welfare laws were unconstitutional. Id. The Court held
that the restriction violated the First Amendment. The government speech doctrine did not
shield the restriction, because the LSC program sought to facilitate private speech rather than
promote a particular government message. Id. at 542. “Like lawyers, professors are not hired
to act under color of state law and speak a prescribed message.” Spurgeon, supra note 11, at
421.
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[T]he university is a traditional sphere of free expression
so fundamental to the functioning of our society that the
Government’s ability to control speech within that
sphere by means of conditions attached to the expenditure of Government funds is restricted by the vagueness
and overbreadth doctrines of the First Amendment.274
By citing directly to Keyishian for support, the Court strongly cautioned
against an application of the doctrine that would chill faculty speech in
teaching and research.
The conclusion is the same in the related public employee speech
cases, where the courts consider whether the public employer “commissioned” or “paid” for the speech at issue.275 The Garcetti Court at least
questioned such an application to academic speech when it refused to
rule categorically that the teaching and scholarship paid for by a public
college constituted unprotected speech.276 And the Fourth Circuit made
precisely this point when it ruled in favor of Professor Adams. The court
of appeals clarified that the “official duties” test might apply to a public
university professor’s speech when his “assigned duties include a specific role in declaring or administering university policy, as opposed to
scholarship or teaching.”277 The University could not render a faculty
member’s core academic speech unprotected simply by stating that the
teacher was paid for “writing, public appearances, and service within
[his] respective field[ ].”278 That “thin thread” was insufficient to render
Adams’s academic speech part of the University’s message,279 and the
Ninth Circuit concurred with this reasoning.280 Consequently, the government speech doctrine fares no better than the prior counterarguments
when applied to faculty speech.
The three counterarguments ultimately collapse because they incorrectly assume that the government should be the primary—if not the
sole—institution engaged in the search for truth. This position fails to
recognize that there are other private institutions engaged in this pursuit,
274

Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 200 (1991) (citing Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 603, 605–06

(1967)).
275 Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 411 (2006) (“Restricting speech that owes its existence to a public employee’s professional responsibilities does not infringe any liberties the
employee might have enjoyed as a private citizen. It simply reflects the exercise of employer
control over what the employer itself has commissioned or created.”).
276 Id. at 425.
277 Adams v. Trs. of Univ. of N.C.–Wilmington, 640 F.3d 550, 563 (4th Cir. 2011) (emphasis added).
278 Id. at 564.
279 Id.
280 See Demers v. Austin, 746 F.3d 402, 412 (9th Cir. 2014); see also supra Part II.C.
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the foremost being private universities.281 Further, the First Amendment
protects the freedom of these private institutions to pursue this venture
even from particular worldviews that some might find controversial or
incompatible with democratic values.282 Aversion to these proprietary
ventures does not dilute the limits the Free Speech Clause simultaneously
places upon the public university.283 It must search for knowledge without a preference for any particular worldview because public universities
are precluded from determining what is orthodox.284 Public university
officials may bristle at this restriction, but it is the price for being the arm
of the state.285 “Arguably, this [F]irst [A]mendment combination of limiting state interference with the discretion of private universities while
constraining their public counterparts”286 produces greater freedom for
all. The resulting pluralism within the academic world provides a greater
diversity of ideas than would a uniform “rule that would subject all universities to the commitment to diversity of thought that the [F]irst
[A]mendment imposes on public ones.”287 Our nation has taken the position that truth is better found “out of a multitude of tongues, (rather)
than through any kind of authoritative selection.”288 Those arguments
281 BOK, supra note 56, at 15 (“Most of [America’s colleges and universities] are
private . . . .”).
282 Rabban, supra note 53, at 268 (“Private universities may choose to establish educational policies that deviate from democratic values in ways forbidden to state institutions.”).
283 Because private universities have their own institutional First Amendment rights to
control their message, professors at such private schools have less academic freedom than
faculty at public universities where the First Amendment protects the individual professors
from discriminatory state action.
284 W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (“If there is any fixed
star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what
shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens
to confess by word or act their faith therein. If there are any circumstances which permit an
exception, they do not now occur to us.”).
285 Of course, complete privatization is always an option for public colleges that do not
want to be constrained by these constitutional limits. The University of Virginia, for example,
appears to be moving in that direction by initiating a massive funding campaign to raise private financial support. See Erin Strout, U. of Virginia Unexpectedly Opens $3-Billion Campaign to Become a ‘Private’ Public University, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (June 25, 2004), http://
chronicle.com/article/U-of-Virginia-Unexpectedly/9589/. Furthermore, the University’s
schools of business and law have agreed with state officials “to forgo any state funding in
return for freedom to set their own tuition, admit more nonresident students and escape state
supervision over their internal affairs.” BOK, supra note 56, at 66. An even more extreme
proposal would effectively privatize the entire system of higher education. Under this proposal, state governments would eliminate all direct subsidies to state institutions. Instead, “states
would maintain levels of support similar to those previously given to institutions but give the
funds to students in the form of scholarships . . . .”). Id. at 67.
286 Rabban, supra note 53, at 268.
287 Id. at 268–69; see also BOK, supra note 56, at 22 (“The number and diversity of our
colleges and universities allow prospective students to find a program to suit almost any special need or preference.”).
288 Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (alteration in original) (citation
omitted).
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that would weaken the First Amendment’s force over teaching and scholarship would also weaken the robust educational heritage that the amendment preserves.
CONCLUSION
A public university professor’s speech related to classroom instruction and academic scholarship should be entitled to heightened First
Amendment protection under the public employee speech doctrine. The
High Court effectively affirmed this position in Keyishian—the one Supreme Court case that directly addressed a state university’s power under
the First Amendment to restrict teaching and publishing. The federal
courts of appeals that have addressed the issue directly have held the
same. Further, these holdings are consistent with the policy behind the
public employee speech doctrine, which favors maximum freedom of
private speech on matters of public interest consistent with the government employer’s mission. In the academic context, professors and the
public at large have vital interests in the knowledge yielded in teaching
and scholarship; the state university, whose mission is to facilitate the
creation and dissemination of such knowledge, simply has little grounds
to restrict it. Therefore, as a general matter, when a public university
seeks to discipline a professor who teaches or writes on a matter of public concern, the Pickering balance should weigh presumptively in the
professor’s favor. This standard does not shield inferior and insubordinate teachers from discipline, nor does it hamstring the university
from protecting its curriculum, its students, and its academic integrity.
The standard simply recognizes that the teacher at a public college is a
private citizen with a unique educational calling and that his employer is,
in the end, a government agency accountable to the Constitution. The
professor must be free to teach and write, and the Constitution grants him
that freedom.

